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The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System
Stephen Yeldermant
Because it must rely on imperfect information, the patent system will inevitably
make mistakes. To determine how the system ought to err in cases of uncertainty-
and whether a given mistake is worth correcting-scholars have composed a
simple picture of the consequences of error in either direction. On the one hand,
erroneous patent awards impose unjustified costs. On the other hand, erroneous
patent denials discourage successful inventors and reduce incentives to create in
the future. The result is an essentially indeterminate balancing, in which policies
of overly liberal awards drive up costs, and policies of overly cautious awards drive
down incentives.
As this Article will show, this conventional approach to error costs under-
states the role that accuracy plays in producing the benefits of the patent system.
Critically, the incentives to invent created by the patent system depend on the
difference between an inventor's expected returns if she invents and her expected
returns if she does not invent. Erroneous patent awards do not simply increase the
costs of the patent system but also narrow the expected difference between inventing
and not inventing. Undeserved patent rights thus undermine the very incentives
the system is intended to create.
This Article presents a framework for evaluating the value of accuracy in the
patent system. As it turns out, the consequences of an undeserved patent depend
significantly on a factor that has not been previously given much attention: whether
the unsatisfied patentability requirement is one that seeks to influence a mutually
exclusive choice. Some patentability doctrines satisfy this condition, but others do
not. The result is that erroneous patent awards may in some ways be more harm-
ful and in other ways less harmful than previously thought.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, it is an almost universally accepted proposition that
the patent system makes too many mistakes. Not that there are
too many randomly distributed errors, but a pattern of mistakes
that result in a system that is consistently (and inappropriately)
biased in a pro-patent direction. Patents, it is thought, are too
easy to acquire in the first place, too difficult for challengers to
revoke later on, and too profitable to enforce in dubious circum-
stances. Countless books and law review articles have been
founded on essentially this premise,1 and in recent years both
1 See, for example, Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley
Tech L J 577, 589-91 (1999) (linking the "numerous incentives inside the PTO to issue
rather than reject patent applications" to the problem of low-quality patents); John R.
Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U ImI L Rev 305, 314-16, 318-21; Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to
Create a Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 763, 767-68 (2002); John H. Barton,
Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 493-95 (2003); Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innova-
tion and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and
Progress, and What to Do about It 136-37 (Princeton 2004); Joseph Farrell and Robert P.
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix
Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 Berkeley
Tech L J 943, 944-46 (2004) ("[G]iven the rapid increase in the volume of patent applica-
tions ... , it would be astounding if patent quality had not suffered."); Christopher R.
Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 Minn L Rev 101,
133-34 (2006) (discussing the ways in which courts err in favor of the patent holder dur-
ing patent validity challenges); Doug Lichtman and Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent
Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 Stan L Rev 45, 47-48 (2007); Dan L. Burk and Mark
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Congress and the Supreme Court have taken steps to weaken
the power of patents having "suspect validity."2
Despite the bevy of proposals intended to curb the granting
and enforcement of undeserved patent rights, there is surpris-
ingly little basis to conclude that the current state of things is
actually suboptimal. It is true that the system currently makes
patent rights available in some cases in which the black-letter
patentability requirements have probably not been satisfied.3
But to conclude that the system ought to err differently-that is,
that uncertain cases should be decided against patent protec-
tion-one must have some way of comparing the costs of an
error in either direction. If the costs of erroneously denying
patent protection are greater than the costs of erroneously
providing patent protection, then there may be no reason to
change the current balance of errors. In fact, doing so might
actually increase the costs of errors overall, causing more harm
than good.4
And it is here that existing theory and empirics flounder.
The problem is that the conventional understanding of error
costs in the patent system yields no definite conclusions. On the
one hand, it is widely accepted that undeserved patents impose
unjustified costs. The private value of patents necessarily comes
at some expense to the public, and erroneous grants incur these
costs without offsetting public benefits.5 On the other hand, it is
A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 25, 28-29 (Chicago 2009)
(describing how the current system of patent litigation encourages holdup and impedes
innovation); Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 Geo
Wash L Rev 498, 538-42 (2015); Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U Pa L Rev
827, 837-39, 858-63 (2016). See also Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L J
470, 473 n 5 (2011) (summarizing this literature).
2 See eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy concur-
ring); Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593, 608 (2010). See also Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA), Pub L No 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011).
3 See Part I.B.
4 See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 Tex
L Rev 1041, 1068 (2011).
5 See Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 670-71 (1969); Mark A. Lemley and Carl
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J Econ Persp 75, 77 (Spring 2005); Jeremy W. Bock,
Does the Presumption of Validity Matter? An Experimental Assessment, 49 U Richmond L
Rev 417, 449 (2015); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on
the Hindsight Issue before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 Yale J L & Tech 1, 31-
32 n 129 (2007) (questioning whether granting an undeserving patent incurs more social
costs than denying a deserving patent); T. Randolph Beard, et al, Quantifying the Cost of
Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 Yale J L & Tech 240, 243-45
2017] 1219
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equally accepted that mistakes in the opposite direction-
denials of patent protection to those who deserve it-undermine
the private incentives to invent that are the reason for having a
patent system in the first place.6 The theory, after all, is that
inventors will invest in research and development in expecta-
tion of receiving patent rights. When that promise is not kept,
future inventors will expect smaller rewards from the patent
system going forward and consequently will invest less in the
very research and development that the patent system is sup-
posed to encourage.
In the end, this understanding of errors reduces to a refer-
endum on the costs and benefits of the patent system. 7 If the
marginal benefits of patent-induced innovation are large com-
pared to the marginal costs of an incremental patent, it is pref-
erable to grant lots of them. But, if the marginal costs of each
additional patent grant are large compared to the marginal ben-
efits of patent-induced innovation, it is better to be quite stingy
with patent rights.8 And because we lack answers to these
central empirical questions,9 the conventional approach yields
no clear guidance one way or the other.10 Faced with this puzzle,
(2010); Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev at 127 (cited in note 1); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Non-
obviousness: A Comment on Three Learned Papers, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 431, 434-35
(2008) (noting the existence of "structural features in the patent system" that systemati-
cally generate erroneous grants); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 549 (cited in note 1);
Shubha Ghosh and Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Houston L Rev 1219, 1228, 1244-45 (2004); Merges, 14
Berkeley Tech L J at 592-93 (cited in note 1); Shubha Ghosh, Beyond Hatch- Waxman, 67
Rutgers L Rev 779, 801 (2015). See also Michadl J. Meurer and Katherine J. Strandburg,
Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 547, 556
(2008) (noting the typicality of the cost-benefit approach to measuring erroneous patent
grants).
6 See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 Fla St U L Rev 735, 760
(2012); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U Pa L Rev
2135, 2141 (2009); Bock, 49 U Richmond L Rev at 448 (cited in note 5); Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495, 1521 (2001).
7 See Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 566 US 66, 92
(2012); Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 744 (cited in note 6); Bock, 49 U Richmond L Rev
at 448-49 (cited in note 5).
8 See Glynn S. Lunney Jr, E-Obviousness, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 363, 385-
86 (2001); Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 744 (cited in note 6).
9 See Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 Brooklyn L Rev
1335, 1337-38 (2013); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 Va L Rev
65, 75-84 (2015).
10 See Mandel, 9 Yale J L & Tech at 31-32 n 129 (cited in note 5); Bock, 49 U
Richmond L Rev at 448-49 (cited in note 5).
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scholars have either explicitly reserved judgment on the ques-
tion of how the patent system ought to err11 or simply fallen
back on (disputed) priors about the costs and benefits of patent
protection.12
As this Article will show, this widely adopted framework is
not only indeterminate but also incomplete. The fundamental
problem is that it understates the role that accuracy plays in
producing the benefits of the patent system. The reason for
offering patent protection is to create incentives to do particular
things: to create new, useful, and nonobvious inventions, to dis-
close them publicly, and to do all this while complying with a
number of rules designed to protect the public and other inven-
tors. The magnitude of the patent incentives to do these things
depends both on what the system rewards and on what.the sys-
tem does not reward-just as the power of a prize depends on
granting it when it is deserved and withholding it otherwise.
Erroneous patent grants narrow the difference between the
expected outcome from inventing and the expected outcome from
not inventing, thus reducing the marginal reward offered to do
the former instead of the latter. In this way, undeserved patents
do not simply impose unjustified costs, but actively undermine
the very ex ante incentives that the patent system is intended to
create.
Prior scholarship has noted these incentive effects only in
passing and has not explored their consequences for how the
patent system should err in cases of uncertainty.13 At a mini-
mum, adding them to the traditional account of error costs nec-
essarily shifts the optimal balance of errors in the direction of
more skepticism toward claims of patent rights. With a few basic
assumptions about observability and inventors' perceptions of
11 See, for example, Daniel J. Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 Tex L Rev 303, 330-31 n 134 (2013); Mandel, 9 Yale J L &
Tech at 31-32 n 129 (cited in note 5); Bock, 49 U Richmond L Rev at 449 (cited in
note 5); Ghosh and Kesan, 40 Houston L Rev at 1227-29 (cited in note 5).
12 See, for example, Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 435-36 (cited in note 5).
13 See Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8
Minn J L Sci & Tech 1, 8-9 (2007); Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent
Settlement Puzzle, 91 Tex L Rev 283, 294-95 (2012); Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments,
Perverse Incentives, 27 Harv J L & Tech 1, 44 (2013); Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-
Focused Patent Policy, 96 BU L Rev 1565, 1592-93 & n 129 (2016); Federal Trade
Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law
and Policy ch 5 at 1-2 (Oct 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/X8E7-UWU3.
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the patent system's errors, the conclusion becomes stronger.
When certain conditions hold, this incentive harm can be used to
show that the probability of patentability necessary to justify
patent rights must be at least 50 percent-a "more likely than
not" standard that is more rigorous than the de facto leniency
toward questionable patent rights that exists today. This is true
regardless of the marginal costs and benefits of patent protec-
tion, providing a basis for increasing scrutiny of patent rights
that does not depend on disputed empirical priors about the
costs and benefits of the patent system.14
But there are complications as well. Most importantly, the
effect of an undeserved patent turns out to depend significantly
on the reason that patent was undeserved. Some of the patenta-
bility requirements are intended to influence mutually exclusive
choices-failing to enforce these requirements not only incurs
unjustified costs, but also reduces marginal rewards, thus weak-
ening the power of the incentives created by the patent system
in the future. But other patentability requirements have nothing
to do with shaping incentives, and exist only to mitigate the
costs of the patent system. Failing to enforce these requirements
drives up the costs of the patent system, but does not harm
future incentives. As a result, in cases involving mutually exclu-
sive choices, erroneous patent grants are more harmful than
previously appreciated. But in other cases, errors in favor of
patentability might not be quite as detrimental as previously
assumed.15
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides back-
ground on the traditional approach to error costs in the patent
system and describes how current doctrine generally breaks in
favor of patent rights in close cases. Part II shows how this
14 To put this contribution in context, this Article takes substantive patent law as it
stands and explores the question of how the patent system should err in the resolution of
individual cases in which limited information makes the underlying facts uncertain. This
should be distinguished from prior work evaluating how close questions of statutory con-
struction in patent law should be decided, see, for example, Joseph Scott Miller, Error
Costs & IP Law, 2014 U III L Rev 175, 180-82, or whether it is better to correct mistakes
earlier or later in a patent's life, see, for example, Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1496-97
(cited in note 6).
15 Although this effect has never been explored in detail, several prior scholars
have suggested that undeserved patents can reduce incentives to invent. See note 13. By
bringing this generalized intuition down to specifics, the present analysis reveals not
only the power of this effect but also its limits.
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traditional understanding is incomplete and develops a theory of
accuracy that accounts for the relationship between false posi-
tives and future incentives. Parts III and IV apply that theory to
a number of patent doctrines, illustrating how the importance of
accuracy is tightly bound to a particular rule's purpose. Part V
then discusses implications for patent law and highlights several
questions requiring further study.
I. BACKGROUND
When it comes to mistakes in the patent system, prior
scholarship has typically presented a simple trade-off in which
erroneous grants impose unnecessary ex post costs and erroneous
denials reduce ex ante incentives. Part L.A introduces this ap-
proach to error costs, showing how it has led to essentially
indeterminate prescriptions for how the patent system should
err in cases of uncertainty. Part I.B then introduces a number of
procedural rules and structural features that tend to favor
patent rights in doubtful cases, illustrating that, in practice, the
patent system currently makes patents available even in cases
in which there is an objectively low probability that the patent-
ability requirements have been satisfied.
First, however, a brief note on terminology: The following
discussion is focused on the question of when the system as a
whole should afford patent protection. But the concept of a
"patent system" is really an abstraction. Decisions about patent-
ability are divided across multiple actors weighing in at a num-
ber of distinct stages: the US Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) performs an initial examination and, in some cases, addi-
tional rounds of administrative review; a federal district court
may make findings later on; and the Federal Circuit may review
the district court's (or the PTO's) work at some time after that.
To address the role of accuracy on a systemic level, the following
discussion evaluates the decision to award or deny protection as
if it were a single, unified decision, and without differentiating
based on when or by whom that decision is made. As a general
rule, when this Article refers to "examining" patents or "award-
ing," "granting," or "denying" patent protection, it does not mean
to indicate a decision made at any particular stage of this pro-
cess. Part V.B, however, briefly discusses the value of correcting
erroneous patent grants that have already occurred.
2017] 1223
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A. The Conventional Account of Error Costs
According to the most widely accepted theory, the reason for
awarding patents is to increase prospective inventors' incentives
to invent. 16 When the patent system correctly gives something of
value to a successful inventor, future prospective inventors come
to expect their efforts too will earn them something of value. It
is this private expectation of future reward that produces the
promised public benefits of the patent system-more innovation
as a result of increased incentives to invest in research and
development.17
Mistaken denials of patent protection ("false negatives")
undermine this goal. When deserving inventions are denied pro-
tection, the system fails to keep its promise to reward patentable
inventions through a grant of exclusive rights.18 For the inventor
in question, of course, it is too late, because the invention has
already been made. But if this outcome is observable by future
prospective inventors,19 they will rationally discount the
16 See Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 566 US 66, 92
(2012) ("[T]he promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to crea-
tion, invention, and discovery."); Ward S. Bowman Jr, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal
and Economic Appraisal 2-3 (Chicago 1973). See also F.M. Scherer and David Ross,
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 621-24 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed
1990); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv L Rev
1813, 1821-22 (1984) (describing patents as the "price society pays to stimulate inventive
activity").
17 In addition to this mission of rewarding invention, courts often (and scholars
sometimes) mention a goal of encouraging disclosure. See Part III.B. Whether the goal is
invention or disclosure, the basic mechanism is the same: ex post rewards to create
future ex ante incentives. This Article sets aside other potential functions of the patent
system (such as facilitating coordination or enabling commercialization), which do not
necessarily rely on a "quid pro quo" rewards mechanism. See Yelderman, 96 BU L Rev at
1575-80, 1592-93 (cited in note 13). The costs of an error in either direction will change
significantly if the patent system is intended to serve some other, nonrewards function.
Id at 1598-1603.
18 See Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 760 (cited in note 6); Wagner, 157 U Pa L Rev
at 2141 (cited in note 6); Bock, 49 U Richmond L Rev at 448 (cited in note 5); Mandel, 9
Yale J L & Tech at 31-32 n 129 (cited in note 5). See also Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L
Rev at 435-36 (cited in note 5) (acknowledging this risk but suggesting any harm to
innovation will be small).
19 Observability of outcomes is a central (and common) assumption in analysis of
the error costs of the patent system. See, for example, Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev
at 434 (cited in note 5). If future inventors cannot observe how present inventors are
being treated, then there is no reason for the government to keep its end of the patent
bargain. Moreover, if inventors know this, they have no reason to trust the patent-
granting authority and thus will not make investments in reliance on its promise. For
[84:12171224
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expected value of participating in the patent system to reflect
the risk that they too will be denied a patent when they deserve
one. The failure to offer a reward in the deserving cases of the
present thus reduces the expected value of investing in patenta-
ble inventions in the future.20
It is important to note that the relationship between any
particular false negative and future incentives to invent is in-
direct. The harm of a false negative is rooted in ex ante incen-
tives-the observed treatment of present inventors affects how
other (future) inventors will expect to be treated. Because
hundreds of thousands of patents are granted every year, 21 no
single false negative by itself will scuttle future incentives to in-
vest in socially valuable projects. Rather, it is the expected rate
of false negatives in general that will determine the incentives
created by the patent system. A small number of errors like
these may not have much effect at all. But have too many, and
the expected benefits of participating in the patent system will
be reduced-undermining the patent system's central goal of
increasing ex ante incentives to invest in the creation of patent-
able inventions.
In the other direction, the obvious harm caused by an erro-
neous award of patent protection (a "false positive") is the ex
post cost of the undeserved patent itself. With or without errors,
patents impose costs. In some cases, patents confer market pow-
er, causing deadweight losses-reduced consumption and higher
prices for consumers-that would not exist in the absence of the
patent grant.22 Proliferation of patents can also result in higher
further discussion of the observability of patent outcomes, see notes 98-103 and accom-
panying text.
20 See Wagner, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2141 (cited in note 6); Anup Malani and Jonathan
S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 Georgetown L J 637, 650-52 (2013).
See also Kaplow, 97 Harv L Rev at 1838 (cited in note 16).
21 See US Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar
Years 1963-2015 (June 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/DG5B-8RUZ.
22 See Mayo, 566 US at 92; Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 539 (cited in note 1);
Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 657 (cited in note 20); Beard, et al, 12 Yale J
L & Tech at 243-45 (cited in note 5); Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev at 127 (cited in note 1); Mark
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex L Rev 1031, 1059-60
(2005); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech L J 667, 690 (2004); Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at
767-68 (cited in note 1); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 592 (cited in note 1); Lemley,
95 Nw U L Rev at 1517-19 & n 85 (cited in note 6) (discussing the social cost of patent
holdup, which occurs when patent owners seek "to license even clearly bad patents for
2017] 1225
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transaction costs, because using a recently developed technology
will require more patent searching, negotiation, and, potentially,
litigation.23 And patents can impose dynamic harm as well. For
example, the exclusive rights of a patent grant can create incen-
tives for others to design or invent "around" the patent. This
work can be wasteful even when it succeeds, and sometimes it is
prohibitively expensive or impossible.24 In this way, a patent
grant may not only reduce use of the patented technology itself,
but also inhibit future innovation in related areas.2
All of these ex post costs are expected to be incurred whether
or not a patent is deserved. The difference is whether these costs
are justified. In the case of a meritorious grant, the costs of
patenting are understood as the price to pay for rewarding
invention through a system of exclusive rights. But, in the case
of an unjustified grant, the full costs of a patent are incurred
without any offsetting benefits.26 Denial is preferable when a
patent is undeserved, because it reduces the cost of having a
patent system without harming ex ante incentives.
The patent system thus must balance the risk of failing to
adequately reward invention (through erroneous denials) against
royalty payments small enough that licensees decide it is not worth going to court");
Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 Duke L J 1701, 1714 (2016).
23 See Mayo, 566 US at 92; Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 768 (cited in note 1);
Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1502, 1507-08, 1515 (cited in note 6); Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev
at 1064 (cited in note 22); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 690 (cited in note 22); Malani
and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 656-57 (cited in note 20).
24 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 690 (cited in note 22); Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev
at 127-28 (cited in note 1); Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 767-68 (cited in note 1).
25 See Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1516 (cited in note 6); Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev at
1060-62 (cited in note 22); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 592 (cited in note 1); Miller,
19 Berkeley L J at 690 (cited in note 22). See also Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev at 127-28 (cited
in note 1); Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 767-68 (cited in note 1); Burstein, 83 Geo
Wash L Rev at 539 (cited in note 1); Masur, 65 Duke L J at 1714-15 (cited in note 22).
26 See Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 670 (1969) (noting the necessity of patent
challenges, without which "the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification"); Mandel, 9 Yale J L & Tech at 31-
32 n 129 (cited in note 5); Beard, et al, 12 Yale J L & Tech at 241-42 (cited in note 5);
Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev at 127 (cited in note 1); Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 435
(cited in note 5); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 549 (cited in note 1); Ghosh and Kesan,
40 Houston L Rev at 1228, 1244-45 (cited in note 5); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at
592-93 (cited in note 1); Ghosh, 67 Rutgers L Rev at 801 (cited in note 5); Masur, 65
Duke L J at 1715 (cited in note 22). See also Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark
L Rev at 556 (cited in note 5) (noting the typicality of this approach). For a discussion of
disclosure benefits that might be lost in the case of a justified denial, see note 28.
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the cost of unnecessary patents (through erroneous grants). The
following table summarizes these potential outcomes:
TABLE 1. ONE-SIDED INCENTIVES MODEL
Decision Invention Patentable Invention Not Patentable
Award - Imposes Ex Post Costs - Imposes Ex Post Costs
Patent (True Positive) (False Positive)
Deny - Reduces Ex Ante Incentives * No Ex Post Costs
Patent No Ex Post Costs (True Negative)(False Negative)
As Table 1 illustrates, the decision to award a patent (top
row) imposes ex post costs whether or not the patentability re-
quirements have been satisfied.27 The consequences of a denial,
however, turn on truth. Denying a patent always saves ex post
costs-whether or not the denial was merited.28 If the denial was
deserved (bottom right quadrant), these ex post costs are avoided
27 This table and the ensuing discussion refer to the costs and benefits of these out-
comes at a systemic level, without regard for whether an error is made earlier or later in
time. For a discussion of the consequences of errors in either direction at the examina-
tion stage in particular, see Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 Wm &
Mary L Rev 675, 689-701 (2009); Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 746-49, 753-58, 767-76
(cited in note 6).
28 As noted above, this analysis explicitly sets aside any ex post benefits that might
follow from a grant of patent protection-such as facilitating coordination or increasing
incentives to commercialize. See note 17. Nonetheless, it is possible that denying a
patent will impose ex post costs, as in some cases the public will be unable to use the
information disclosed in the rejected patent application. While this harm is theoretically
possible, in practice it is quite rare for a denial of patent rights to result in any case-
specific loss of disclosure at all. By default, patent applications become public eighteen
months after filing, which will usually occur well before any final decision has been made
about an applicant's entitlement to a patent. See 35 USC § 122(b)(1); 37 CFR § 1.211.
Under certain conditions applicants may request nonpublication, see 35 USC
§ 122(b)(2)(B), but this option is infrequently exercised. In 2009 (the last year for which
data is publicly available), nearly 95 percent of patent applications were published with-
in eighteen months of filing. See Tegernsee Experts Group, Study Mandated by the
Tegernsee Heads: 18-Month Publication *17 (Sept 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/
NE8H-VZZ6. And even those 5 percent of applications not published at eighteen months
can still become public if at any point they ultimately result in an issued patent. See 35
USC § 153. So, in the end, an erroneous denial results in the loss of that inventor's prof-
fered disclosure only in the rare case in which: (a) the inventor elected nonpublication;
(b) the erroneous denial occurred during examination (as opposed to postgrant proceed-
ings or litigation); and (c) that erroneous denial by an examiner was at no point corrected
through a request for continued examination, see 37 CFR § 1.114, or appellate review by
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, see 35 USC § 134.
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with no downside. But if the denial was erroneous because the
patentability requirements were satisfied (bottom left quadrant),
these ex post cost savings are tempered by a reduction in future
ex ante incentives to invent.
Under this framework, the certainty required to justify
patent rights depends on the relationship between the ex ante
incentives and the ex post costs of the patent system. To put the
task of balancing false positives and false negatives in more
formal terms, consider an objective examiner applying the sub-
stantive patentability requirements to the facts known to her in
order to estimate the probability that a specific application satis-
fies those requirements.29 Call this application-specific estimate
q, which as a probability estimate ranges between zero and one.
The task of the patent policymaker is to set a threshold T for all
patent applications, such that applications with q > T will result
in patent rights and applications with q equal to or below that
threshold will be denied patent rights.
Taking substantive patent law and the examiner's level of
information as givens,30 the ideal probability threshold T can be
determined by comparing the expected consequences of an
action in either direction. Whether deserved or not, granting a
patent can be expected to impose ex post costs-call these esti-
mated incremental costs C. Going the other direction, denying a
patent avoids these ex post costs with certainty, but carries a
risk of undermining ex ante incentives going forward. When the
rejected invention really was patentable, a denial reduces pro-
spective inventors' expectations of receiving patent rights when
they deserve them in the future. The resulting diminished ex
ante incentives reduce the public benefits of the patent system
by some amount IFN.31 Unlike ex post costs, however, this harm
29 The term "objective examiner" is used here to distinguish this theorized probability
estimation step from the way patent examiners and district-court judges actually scruti-
nize patents under present arrangements. As discussed in Part I.B, these decision-
makers review patents and patent applications through the lens of various presump-
tions, and may themselves be subject to certain biases.
30 For a discussion of this choice, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
31 An important feature of this framework is that the objective examiner can make
no individualized assessments of C and IFN; she may apply only generally applicable
patent law to the facts of the case and make the decision to grant or deny based on the
resulting output q. This constraint reflects the longstanding principle of patent law that
the validity of patent rights is a legal question, not a matter of agency or court discre-
tion. See 35 USC § 102 ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless. ). See also
Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 744-45 (cited in note 6).
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is incurred only in cases in which patent rights were actually
deserved. The expected cost of denying patent rights can thus be
written as q * IFN-the probability-discounted harm to future ex
ante incentives in the event of a false negative.
Patent rights should be awarded when the cost of doing so is
less than the cost of denying them-that is, when C < q * IFN- A
patent should thus be granted if and only if q > T, where
(1)T =
IFN
As this equation illustrates, under the conventional view,
the probability necessary to justify awarding patent protection
turns on the relationship between the ex post costs C of granting
an additional patent and the public harm IFN from reduced ex
ante incentives following an erroneous denial. If the ex post
costs of an incremental patent grant are low compared to the
public benefits that will be lost from a diminution of ex ante
incentives, the minimum probability necessary to justify patent
rights will be low as well, and the patent system ought to grant
promiscuously. But if the ex post costs of an incremental patent
grant are large (or the public benefits that will be lost as a result
of an erroneous denial are small), the probability of patentability
necessary to justify a patent will be quite demanding.
Because this basic framework (and similar variations) will
be used throughout the Article, it is worth pausing to recognize
its limitations. This is a model only for setting the probability of
patentability necessary to justify a patent grant, not for mini-
mizing the total error costs of the patent system. The decision to
take (a) substantive patent law and (b) the objective examiner's
level of information as givens results in serious constraints on a
policymaker's ability to maximize the public benefits of the
patent system.32 These constraints are embraced here for con-
sistency with the literature suggesting that the patent system
grants too many invalid patents, 33 and they will prove useful for
32 For a generalized model of error costs in the patent system, see Golden, 89 Tex L
Rev at 1065-74 (cited in note 4).
33 The literature on patent quality almost inevitably accepts substantive patent law
as it stands. See, for example, Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 UC Davis L Rev
963, 990-91 (2016); Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 745 (cited in note 6); Malani and Masur,
101 Georgetown L J at 639 n 7 (cited in note 20); Lichtman and Lemley, 60 Stan L Rev
at 47 (cited in note 1); William Alsup, A District Judge's Proposal for Patent Reform: Re-
visiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Calibrating Deference to the Strength of
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bringing the incentives effects of false positives into sharp relief
in the next Part. But the use of this highly constrained model is
not meant to suggest that the public benefits of the patent
system can be maximized solely through modulations in the
probability-of-patentability threshold, or that substantive patent
law is necessarily set correctly as it presently stands.34
For reference throughout this Article, this particular ap-
proach to balancing errors in the patent system is called the
"one-sided incentives" model. This term refers to the fact that, in
this framework, more-liberal patent awards consistently lead to
greater incentives to invent. Incentives are one-sided because
more is always more: a lower probability-of-patentability
threshold means more patents, which in turn means greater
incentive to invent in the future. The only constraint on the
patent free-for-all is the matter of cost. Future rewards would be
maximized through prolific patent granting; it is only the ex
post costs of those grants that create a need for balance.35
the Examination, 24 Berkeley Tech L J 1647, 1650 (2009); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J
at 589 (cited in note 1). See also Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 Fordham
L Rev 3091, 3098-99 (2014) (observing that "patent quality" is typically synonymous
with validity under existing law). Proposals to encourage more patent litigation can,
however, be understood as calls to increase the level of information available to the
patent system.
34 Some readers might also question why the threshold T does not depend on the
objective examiner's priors about the probability that an application is valid prior to
examination, as is common in total error cost models. As Professor Louis Kaplow
explains, this kind of Bayesian analysis is inappropriate in cases in which future actors
are likely to behave differently depending on how T is set. In other words, the ratio of
valid to invalid applications coming into the patent office is likely endogenous to T. See
Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 Yale L J 738, 748, 783-86 (2012). An additional
question some readers may have is whether the examiner's task should be viewed as an
inquiry into probabilities or likelihood ratios. See Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests
and Legal Decision Rules, 16 Am L Econ Rev 1, 5-13 (2014) (explaining this distinction).
This discussion is framed around probabilities of patentability to enable more straight-
forward comparisons of the costs of each type of error. Once these error costs are under-
stood, a given level of scrutiny may in some cases be more profitably implemented
through an analysis of comparative likelihoods. See id at 20-25, 34-36.
35 To be clear, under this model, more-generous patent awards are only certain to
increase incentives to create the first generation of a technology. At some point, overly
expansive patent rights might well inhibit subsequent innovation, as future inventors
would have to contend with these existing patent rights, reducing their reward for mak-
ing improvements to the original technology. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and
Incentives 134 (MIT 2004). This complication is not actually relevant here, though: the
claim that liberal patent awards would "maximize" incentives to invent is made only to
distinguish the two-sided incentives model presented in Part II, in which overly generous
patent rewards can reduce incentives to make even the first generation of a technology.
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This tug-of-war between ex ante incentives on the one hand
and ex post costs on the other means that, under the one-sided
incentives framework, any level of probability is a potentially
appropriate threshold for justifying patent rights. When the
patent system creates significant public benefits at low cost-
that is, when IFN is much greater than C-the threshold neces-
sary to justify patent rights dives toward zero, and patent rights
can be justified even for inventions that appear quite unlikely to
meet the legal standards of patentability. And when the patent
system has high costs and yields modest public benefits-that is,
when C approaches IFN-the threshold necessary to justify
patent rights moves toward one, and patent rights should be
available only when it appears highly likely that they are actu-
ally deserved. The one-sided incentives model has no internal
bounds. On its own terms, the best policy could be to give
patents to everyone or to no one.
These extremes are possible because the expected harm of
erroneously awarding a patent C could be many times larger
than the harm of erroneously withholding a patent IFN and vice
versa.36 If the expected cost of granting a patent and the ex-
pected cost of denying a patent were approximately equal, the
threshold for awarding patent protection would hover some-
where near 50 percent.37 But there is no reason to assume that
the patent system's ex post costs and ex ante incentives align in
the way necessary to make this happen. It is entirely possible
that one term dominates the other, and nothing requires the
model to converge to its midpoint.1s
36 If C > 'FN, then the threshold for granting a patent requires more than 100 per-
cent probability-in other words, patents should be granted to no one, no matter how
certain it appears they've satisfied the patentability requirements. It might seem that
these values are unlikely, given the fact that we do have a patent system, but unfortu-
nately the available empirics do not even allow one to rule out such extreme possibilities.
See note 39 and accompanying text.
37 This occurs when the expected incremental cost of a patent grant is half the
expected incentive harm from a false negative-that is, IFN = 2C.
38 See Kaplow, 121 Yale L J at 784-86 (cited in note 34) ("[W]e should instead be
troubled by the notion that it may make sense, even as an approximation, to employ a
single threshold . . . (such as fifty percent) to make important decisions in a wide range
of contexts in which the consequences vary dramatically."). Note that there is sometimes
an intuitive appeal to making decisions around a 50 percent probability threshold
because doing so minimizes the total number of errors that are made. For example, if a
coin has a 51 percent chance of coming up heads, a guesser would be correct most often
by always calling "heads." But that hardly means that is the best strategy. If the penalty
for incorrectly calling "tails" is losing $1 and the penalty for incorrectly calling "heads" is
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Unfortunately, the empirical studies necessary to narrow
this range of plausible cutoff points are sorely lacking and not
likely to be completed soon. To determine even approximately
how permissive to be in granting patents, one would first need to
estimate the direct ex post costs attributable to an incremental
patent grant. One would then need to estimate the public bene-
fits that might be lost as the result of an individual erroneous
patent denial. This is, empirically, a nonstarter. No one really
knows how much public benefit is produced by the patent sys-
tem in general.39 Attempting to put a number on how individual
decisions to grant or deny affect first ex post costs and then ex
ante incentives seems an impossible undertaking. The result is
that the one-sided incentives model yields essentially no con-
clusions as to how the patent system ought to err in cases of
uncertainty.
This indeterminacy is a likely reason why the appropriate
balance of errors in the patent system has been addressed so
glancingly.40 Under the conventional framework, there simply
isn't much to say. More scrutiny saves ex post costs but reduces
ex ante incentives; more permissiveness increases ex ante incen-
tives and drives up ex post costs. And the magnitudes of the
effects on either side of this balancing are simply unknown.
B. How the System Errs Presently
While prevailing theory and the available empirics are
equivocal as to how patent cases should be decided in the face of
uncertainty, the current patent system is decidedly stacked in
just one direction: in cases of doubt, patents are available. This
losing a finger, the same guesser might reasonably prefer to always call "tails." Minimizing
the costs of errors requires considering not just the probability that a guess will prove
correct but also the consequences of being wrong. See Alan Devlin and Michael Jacobs,
Antitrust Error, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev 75, 97-98 & n 91 (2010).
39 See Liivak, 78 Brooklyn L Rev at 1337-38 (cited in note 9) ("Though this under-
lying purpose is simple to state, it has created an intractable cost-benefit analysis that
resists either justification or, alternatively, falsification."); Ouellette, 101 Va L Rev at
75-84 (cited in note 9).
40 Indeed, the most specific conclusion prior scholars have offered is that the optimal
number of false positives is not zero. See Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 745-46 (cited in
note 6); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 593 (cited in note 1); Wagner, 157 U Pa L Rev
at 2139 (cited in note 6). A number of commentators have explicitly set aside the ques-
tion of how false positives should be balanced against false negatives. See Hemel and
Ouellette, 92 Tex L Rev at 330-31 n 134 (cited in note 11); Mandel, 9 Yale J L & Tech at
31-32 n 129 (cited in note 5); Bock, 49 U Richmond L Rev at 448-49 (cited in note 5).
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outcome is not the product of any single policy lever but rather
the result of a number of procedural rules and structural fea-
tures of both the examination and enforcement stage. These
characteristics in combination cause the patent system to err
consistently in favor of patent rights in cases of uncertainty.
The preference for patent rights begins the moment an
application shows up at the door of the PTO. By long-standing
rule, patent applications are reviewed with a presumption of
patentability; the burden rests on the examiner to show why a
patent should not issue.41 The standard of proof here is moder-
ate: the examiner need only show unpatentability by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.42 Nonetheless, the effect of this burden
assignment is that ties are broken in favor of patentability.43
This presumption would assure that patents issue in close
cases even if the PTO had perfect information. But its effects are
compounded by the limited information available at the exami-
nation stage.44 Because patentability often turns on the non-
existence of prior art,45 the fact that information is missing will
tend to inure to the benefit of a patent applicant, making un-
patentable inventions appear patentable rather than the other
way around. And the information deficit at the PTO is substan-
tial. Patent examiners on average have fewer than twenty hours
to read a patent application, search the prior art, and render
a written decision.46 Moreover, entire categories of relevant
41 See 35 USC § 102(a) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless. ); In re
Oetiker, 977 F2d 1443, 1444-45 (Fed Cir 1992).
42 See Oetiker, 977 F2d at 1444-45; In re Caveney, 761 F2d 671, 674 (Fed Cir 1985).
43 See Oetiker, 977 F2d at 1449 (Plager concurring); Sean B. Seymore, The Presump-
tion of Patentability, 97 Minn L Rev 990, 997-99 (2013).
44 See Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 434 (cited in note 5); Seymore, 49 UC
Davis L Rev at 995-96 (cited in note 33). See also Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F.
Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to
Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, 99 Rev Econ & Stat
*8-9, 41 (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8HFC-6GK6 (finding that "as
examiners are given less time to review applications . . . , the less prior art they cite, the
less likely they are to make time-consuming rejections, and the more likely they are to
grant patents").
45 See Frakes and Wasserman, 99 Rev Econ & Stat at *7-8 (cited in note 44).
46 See id at *8-10 (estimating that patent examiners spend an average of nineteen
hours per application); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives: Pres-
sure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 Ohio St L J 379, 414 n 135 (2011) (citing an
email from a PTO official stating that the average examination time allotted ranged
from fourteen to thirty-two hours depending on the complexity level of the art); Ford, 164
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information are largely unavailable to patent examiners. For
example, an invention can become unpatentable if it is in public
use or on sale for too long before an application is filed. But
activities like these do not usually produce the kind of written
records an examiner can discover, so unless the applicant herself
knows about such activity and discloses it, the examiner likely
will be left in the dark.47 And because applications are presumed
patentable, the default outcome in a case of missing information
is an issued patent.
Imperfect incentives at the PTO further lower the threshold
of patentability in practice. As others have noted, the agency has
a financial interest in granting rather than rejecting: as a direct
result of an issued patent, the PTO can expect to receive sub-
stantial renewal (or "maintenance") fees in the future.48 These
maintenance fees are essentially pure profit for the agency-the
PTO gets to keep these receipts and incurs only trivial marginal
costs in the process. 49 Asymmetries in the appeal process further
distort the agency's incentives-a PTO decision to deny an ap-
plication may be swiftly appealed to the courts, but the agency is
never required to defend its decision to grant a patent. 0 So, to
the extent the agency wants to avoid appeals in general and
U Pa L Rev at 860 (cited in note 1) (estimating a similar average examination time using
a different methodology).
47 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to
Deceive the Patent Office, 1 UC Irvine L Rev 323, 327-28 (2011); Mark D. Janis, Rethink-
ing Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent
Law, 11 Harv J L & Tech 1, 56-57 (1997); Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 766-67 (cited
in note 1) ("Hence, the Patent Office is unlikely to be well informed about the relevant
prior art, creating an asymmetry between the patentee's information and the infor-
mation possessed by the Patent Office.").
48 See Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO's Granting Patterns, 66 Vand L
Rev 67, 70, 78 & n 35 (2013).
49 Id at 79-80. See also Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment, 67 Stan L Rev 613, 629-30 (2015) (discussing how maintenance fees cross-
subsidize examination activities).
50 See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 487 (cited in note 1). To be clear, members of the pub-
lic can challenge the agency's decision to grant a patent using the inter partes and post-
grant review procedures created by the AIA. See 35 USC §§ 311-19, 321-29. But these
are processes within the agency, not really appeals, and in any event the patent holder
typically does the work of defending the agency's decision. See 37 CFR §§ 42.120, 42.220;
Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 BC L Rev 881, 914-20 (2015).
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reversals in particular, it has reason to err in favor of granting
in cases of uncertainty.,"
Examiners, too, have reasons to favor allowance over rejec-
tion. The PTO closely monitors examiner productivity using a
"count system," wherein each examiner is required to complete a
specific number of work units every two weeks.52 For productivity-
measurement purposes, rejections and allowances are considered
equivalent, although examiners report that it is usually less
work (and takes less time) to issue an allowance than to level a
rejection.53 As a result, examiners are quietly incentivized to
grant rather than reject patents in close cases.
To be sure, the examiner's is not always the final word. A
patent granted by the PTO can still be challenged through liti-
gation in a federal district court, and a final judgment of invalid-
ity will preclude any further assertion of the patent. 54 But, as at
the initial examination stage, litigation burdens and structural
incentives work to the benefit of patent rights in cases of doubt.
Once issued, a patent enjoys a statutory presumption of
validity. Reversing an erroneous grant by the PTO requires a
challenger to show that the patent is invalid by "clear and con-
vincing evidence"-a higher bar than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard that usually applies in civil litigation.5 This
is so even if the argument for invalidity is based on evidence
that the PTO demonstrably lacked at the time of examination.56
In this way, litigation is not a straightforward mechanism to
counterbalance the information deficit and pro-grant biases of
51 See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 489-99, 505-07 (cited in note 1).
52 See Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U Pa
L Rev 1965, 1990-91 & n 128 (2009); Jaffe and Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents at
133-38 (cited in note 1).
53 See Jaffe and Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents at 133-38 (cited in note 1).
See also Sag and Rohde, 8 Minn J L Sci & Tech at 19 (cited in note 13); Lemley, 95 Nw U
L Rev at 1496 n 3 (cited in note 6); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 590 (cited in note 1).
54 See 35 USC § 282(b); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 US 313, 329-30 (1971).
55 See 35 USC § 282(a); Microsoft Corp v i4i Limited Partnership, 564 US 91, 95, 99
(2011).
56 See Microsoft, 564 US at 109-10; Dow Chemical Co v Nova Chemicals Corp
(Canada), 809 F3d 1223, 1227 (Fed Cir 2015) (Moore concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc).
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the examination stage. To the contrary, in close cases, juries are
explicitly instructed to preserve validity.57
An additional limitation of postgrant error correction is that
it relies on private parties investing in legal process. Challenges
do not come automatically or for free-instead, any given chal-
lenge depends on two or more parties having some reason to see
the dispute through to completion. Patent litigation is expen-
sive, and in many cases it may be more profitable for a firm to
settle a patent claim rather than fight it.58 As a result, it is likely
that some challenges to patents of questionable validity will not
be litigated to final judgment, if they are brought at all.
In combination, these features allow applicants to obtain
and enforce patents in at least some cases in which an objective
examiner would assess the probability of patentability to be less
than 50 percent.59 A number of prior commentators have criti-
cized this arrangement, proposing reforms so that the system
will err against patent rights in questionable cases--or at least
not quite so heavily in favor of them. For example, scholars have
proposed things like revising the presumption of patentability,
changing the compensation structure for patent examiners,
57 See Lichtman and Lemley, 60 Stan L Rev at 47-48 (cited in note 1). See also
Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 434-35 (cited in note 5) (discussing the combina-
tion effects of the presumption of validity and juror biases).
58 For analysis of the private incentives to challenge patents, see Farrell and Merges,
19 Berkeley Tech L J at 948-55 (cited in note 1); Jay P. Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Why
"Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?-The Private and
Social Costs of Patents, 55 Emory L J 61, 80-85 (2006); Sag and Rohde, 8 Minn J L Sci &
Tech at 22-28 (cited in note 13). See also Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are
Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of
Patent Disputes, 84 Wash U L Rev 237, 265-69 (2006) (collecting data on case disposi-
tions, including settlements).
59 See Seymore, 49 UC Davis L Rev at 971-73 (cited in note 33). There are a couple
of features of the patent system that might somewhat mitigate these pro-patent biases.
First, during patent examination, claims are given their "broadest reasonable construc-
tion," 37 CFR § 42.100(b), which can sometimes result in a claim being denied even
though it might have been upheld in litigation. See Meurer, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at
702-03 (cited in note 27). But the effect of this rule is likely small, given that applicants
can usually amend their claims to embrace the narrower (valid) meaning explicitly. See
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, 136 S Ct 2131, 2145 (2016). Second, the AIA cre-
ated new administrative review procedures in which a patent may be revoked under a
preponderance of the evidence standard-thus avoiding the heightened presumption of
validity that issued patents normally enjoy. See AIA § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat at 302-03, 308-
09, 35 USC §§ 316(e), 326(e). However, these procedures still require the challenger to
carry the burden of showing unpatentability, and are themselves to subject to various
procedural and substantive limitations. See note 199.
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tweaking the statutory presumption of validity, and encouraging
more patent litigation.60 All of these have been rooted in a goal of
rebalancing the distribution of errors against patentability-
that is, to require a greater probability that an invention really
is patentable to justify the costs of patent protection.
But, problematically for these proposals, it is not clear that
the current bias in favor of patent protection is actually sub-
optimal. As discussed above, under the conventional, one-sided
incentives model, the probability of patentability necessary to
justify patent rights could be anywhere between zero and one.6'
In fact, it is possible that despite the structural and procedural
biases toward patent rights, the current system actually makes
it too difficult to obtain patent protection. If the probability of
patentability needed to get a patent is currently 0.4, maybe it
should be 0.3.
As a result, there is a logical step missing in the recent calls
to rebalance the errors of the patent system in a more patent-
skeptical direction. It is true that some patents issue even
though they are more likely invalid than valid. It is also true
that some of these patents may be successfully enforced, or oth-
erwise impose ex post costs, despite objective probabilities of
patentability below 50 percent. But without relying on disputed
priors about the costs and benefits of patent protection, it is not
necessarily true that increasing precautions against undeserved
patent rights would be socially beneficial. It could just as easily
work harm.62
II. ACCURACY AND INCENTIVES
This Part explores the role that accuracy plays in determin-
ing the rewards offered by the patent system. The central insight
here is that the incentives created by the patent system depend
on accuracy in two directions: the probability of awarding
60 See, for example, Seymore, 97 Minn L Rev at 1022-31 (cited in note 43) (propos-
ing shifting the burden of persuasion in patent examination); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech
L J at 607-09 (cited in note 1) (proposing changing the compensation structure for exam-
iners); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 704-11 (cited in note 22) (proposing offering a
bounty to encourage more patent litigation); Lichtman and Lemley, 60 Stan L Rev at 59-
65 (cited in note 1) (proposing weakening the presumption of validity); Alsup, 24 Berkeley
Tech L J at 1649-54 (cited in note 33); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 538-48 (cited in
note 1) (proposing expanding standing to enable more patent challenges).
61 See notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
62 See Golden, 89 Tex L Rev at 1068 (cited in note 4).
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patents when they are deserved and the probability of withhold-
ing them when they are undeserved. This fundamentally alters
the optimal balance between false positives and false negatives,
and yields a "two-sided incentives" model that suggests a signifi-
cantly higher probability of patentability should be required to
justify patent rights than the conventional one-sided incentives
model would indicate.
Parts II.A and II.B start by introducing the role that accu-
racy plays in determining the ex ante incentives created by prize
and punishment systems in general. Part II.C then revises the
conventional account of error costs in the patent system to
include this understanding of the value of accuracy. Finally,
Part II.D shows that the answer to the question how should the
patent system err? depends significantly on whether patent law
is seeking to influence mutually exclusive choices, a condition
that has not previously received much attention.
A. Marginal versus Absolute Rewards
To understand the role that accuracy plays in the patent
system, it is helpful to take a step back and explore the theory
for how patent rights provide public benefits in the first place.
According to the dominant account, the purpose of awarding
patents is to incentivize future investments in research and
development.63 Patents are a form of public subsidy to encourage
private actors to engage in a specific socially desirable activity.64
In this way, patents are not so different from prizes or even pun-
ishments-all are publicly funded mechanisms to encourage
private behavior that benefits the public.65
Prize and punishment systems operate using the same fun-
damental model. At heart, they are based on either a promise or
63 See note 17 and accompanying text. While the goal of rewarding invention is the
most commonly accepted justification for the patent system, many of the principles
expounded in this Part can be applied to other functions of the patent system as well.
See Parts III.B-C.
64 See Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in A.
Mitchell Pollnsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1473,
1476-77 (Elsevier 2007); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Refram-
ing the Debate, 81 U Chi L Rev 999, 1028 (2014).
65 See Hemel and Ouellette, 92 Tex L Rev at 312 (cited in note 11); Roin, 81 U Chi
L Rev at 1021 (cited in note 64). Unlike patents and criminal penalties, prizes can be of-
fered by nongovernmental entities as well. See Michael J. Burstein and Fiona E. Murray,
Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 Harv J L & Tech 401, 419-23 (2016).
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a threat, as in: "If you do X, you will get Y." In the case of a
prize, X is usually some socially desirable activity, and Y is some
privately valuable reward-as in, "If you cure cancer, you will
receive $100 million." In the case of a punishment, X is some
socially undesirable activity, and Y is some privately dreaded
result-as in, "If you commit plagiarism, you will be expelled."
Patents are a complex form of prize, in which the offer is, "If you
make an invention that satisfies the patentability criteria, you
will receive some time-limited exclusive rights, the value of which
will depend (at least in part) on the value of your invention."66
A critical component of threats and promises like these is of-
ten left unspoken. Implicit in the offer, "If you do X, you will get
Y," is a promise to carry out the inverse statement: "If you do not
do X, you will not get Y." For purposes of inducing the desired
conduct, this silent, negative promise is as important as the ar-
ticulated, affirmative promise. The logic here is straightforward:
if the target of the promise will receive Y either way, then offering
Y provides no additional incentive to do X. The lure of the offer
depends on Y being bestowed if and only if the target does X.
The effectiveness of a prize or punishment regime depends
on reliable enforcement of both the affirmative and the negative
promises. Consider a prize that offers a fixed payout S to anyone
who performs some specified task.67 The lure of such a prize will
depend, first, on the size of the prize itself and, second, on an
actor's chance of receiving the prize if she in fact performs the
task-call this probability PA. Holding the size of the prize con-
stant, the higher the probability that the prize will be awarded
when deserved, the greater the incentive created by the offer of
the prize. (Conversely, the higher the probability that the prize
will be wrongfully withheld, the smaller the incentive created by
the prize offer.) An actor who performs the specified task re-
ceives S with probability PA, for an expected value of pA * S.
But there is an important complication lurking here. The
expected value given in the prior paragraph describes the abso-
lute reward the actor can expect to receive by performing the
specified task. But it does not give the actor's marginal reward
66 See Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 83 (Oxford 1978) (R.L. Meek, D.D.
Raphael, and P.G. Stein, eds) (suggesting that patents are preferable to simple prizes
because their value can change depending on the value of the underlying invention).
67 Importantly, in the patent system S is not fixed-a complication that will be
dealt with below.
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for performance, because it does not account for the possibility
that she might (erroneously) be given the prize either way. Sup-
pose that, even if she does not perform the specified task, the
target of the promise has some chance po of receiving the prize
by mistake. The additional (or marginal) reward offered to per-
form the desired conduct is the difference between the target's
expectations when she performs the task and her expectations
when she does not perform the task. In the terms given above,
the marginal reward M is given by PA * S - po * S, or:
(2) M = S(pA - po)
Examining this equation, it becomes clear that there are not
two but three levers a prize administrator can pull to maximize
the lure created by a prize: (1) increase the size of the payout S;
(2) increase the probability PA of awarding the prize when it is
deserved; and (3) decrease the probability po of awarding the
prize when it is not deserved. While it is perhaps easiest to cap-
ture public attention by offering a prize of large absolute magni-
tude (lever #1),68 accuracy in awarding that prize (levers #2 and
#3) can affect marginal rewards just as much. Indeed, in an
extreme case, in which the probability of receiving the prize is
the same whether or not the desired task is performed, the offer
will provide no marginal reward at all, no matter how large its
absolute dollar value may be.69
These three levers will be familiar to scholars of criminal law.
I.P.L. Png recognized an analogous relationship between false
convictions and false acquittals back in 1986.70 In fact, the general
point that false convictions (the corollary to undeserved prize
awards) can impair marginal deterrence is now well accepted
68 See, for example, Philips Claims L Prize Victory, 41 Lighting Design & Application
10, 10 (Sept 2011) (reporting Philips's victory of a $10 million prize for a 60-watt LED
replacement lightbulb); Steve Russell, DARPA Grand Winner: Stanley, Stanford Univer-
sity's Robot Car, 183 Popular Mechanics 36, 36-39 (Jan 2006) (describing a $2 million
prize for creation of an autonomous vehicle); $25,000 Orteig Prize Presented to Flier (NY
Times, June 17, 1927).
69 This is the case of PA = po. When this is true, S(PA - po) will be zero no matter
the size of S.
70 See I.P.L. Png, Note, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial
Error, 6 Intl Rev L & Econ 101, 101-02 (1986).
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in the law-and-economics literature.71 But when it comes to
encouraging certain conduct (such as with patents or prizes),
the incentive effects of undeserved rewards have been largely
overlooked.72
To illustrate this principle more concretely, imagine public
health officials want to encourage the world's leading medical
researchers to focus their efforts on creating a vaccine against
the Zika virus. One way to do this would be to offer a $1 million
prize to anyone who creates a successful vaccine. As a first step
to making the prize effective, the administrators would want to
make sure their promise to award the prize to those who deserve
it is credible.73 This much is obvious-if prospective researchers
do not trust the prize administrators (or think they will other-
wise be wrongfully denied the award), they will discount the
possibility of receiving the prize after making their investments
in the vaccine. Reducing the risk that the prize will be wrongly
denied after a researcher has sunk costs to develop the vaccine
will increase the absolute expected reward available from such
an investment, given by PA * S.
But, in addition, it is important for the prize administrators
to make a credible commitment not to award a prize to someone
who has not created a Zika vaccine. For example, the prize
administrators might want to announce the testing criteria they
are planning to use to ensure they do not give a prize based on a
vaccine that does not stop Zika-such as a vaccine that reduces
the appearance of Zika-like symptoms, but has no effect on Zika
71 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the
Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J L Econ & Org 99, 100 (1989); Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J L & Econ 1, 2-3 (1994); Joel
Schrag and Suzanne Scotchmer, The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Crime, 17 Intl Rev L &
Econ 325, 326 (1997); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,
51 Stan L Rev 1477, 1483-84 (1999) ("[G]reater accuracy in the determination of guilt
increases the returns to being innocent."). But see Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error
in Criminal Justice, 128 Harv L Rev 1065, 1126-28 (2015) (challenging the premises of
this argument in the criminal context).
72 Patent scholars have, however, suggested that undeserved patent rewards may
inadvertently encourage wasteful activity-"diverting [] resources out of productive
activities and into the 'patent game."' Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 592 (cited in note
1). This is a harm to future ex ante incentives as a result of erroneous patent grants, but
it is not the same as a reduction in future ex ante incentives to invent.
73 See Burstein and Murray, 29 Harv J L & Tech at 413-14, 444 (cited in note 65)
(observing the importance of commitment mechanisms); Roin, 81 U Chi L Rev at 1067-
68 (cited in note 64); Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1532 (cited in
note 64).
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itself. If a flu researcher thinks she has a good chance of pawn-
ing off an existing flu vaccine as a Zika prophylactic without the
prize administrators being able to tell the difference, then she
will have little incentive to drop her current research and switch
to Zika. Efforts to avoid giving the prize in error will decrease
the expected prize winnings available without actually making
the desired vaccine, given by po * S. This in turn increases the
marginal reward for stopping Zika and thus the effectiveness of
the prize regime.
The incentive-reducing effects of erroneous awards can be
dramatic. For example, suppose a researcher estimates she has
a 60 percent chance of claiming the prize if she pauses her flu
research and instead focuses her efforts on a Zika inoculation
(that is, PA = 0.6). A 60 percent chance of claiming a $1 million
prize might seem like a strong inducement. But this absolute
reward is not the complete picture. To determine how much the
researcher has to gain by researching Zika, one must consider
her probability of receiving the prize undeservedly. If the odds of
successfully pawning off a flu vaccine as a Zika vaccine are 50
percent (that is, po = 0.5), then the marginal expected reward
available by focusing on Zika is only $100,000.74 So, in the end,
the seemingly large $1 million absolute prize actually provides a
(comparatively small) $100,000 of marginal reward.75
B. The Need for a Mutually Exclusive Choice
The distinction between marginal and absolute rewards
might seem a simple point, but it is actually not as straightfor-
ward as it first appears. In fact, there is a subtle but critical lim-
itation at work here that has previously escaped attention: the
difference between marginal and absolute rewards is relevant
only when a prize is being offered to influence a mutually exclu-
sive choice. Without a mutually exclusive decision at stake, the
74 As discussed above, the expected prize reward available by focusing on Zika is
given by S(pA - po). In this example, S = $1 million, PA = 0.6, and po = 0.5, so her expected
reward for pursuing Zika is $100,000.
75 The flip side of this example is that precautions to avoid undeserved awards can
go a long way. For example, if the prize administrator can introduce a test that would
reduce the probability of an erroneous prize award to 10 percent, the original $1 million
cash prize would provide $500,000 in marginal reward. Separately, these increased
precautions will result in fewer prize payments overall-a savings in the "ex post costs"
category discussed below.
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distinction between marginal and absolute rewards collapses,
and mistaken awards do not have the incentive-reducing effect
described above.
To illustrate, return to the researcher considering whether
to seek a $1 million prize for developing a Zika vaccine. As
before, assume the competition is run rather sloppily: focusing
on Zika gives the researcher a 60 percent chance of claiming the
prize, while instead continuing her flu research gives her a 50
percent chance of claiming the prize undeservedly. For the rea-
sons discussed above, these haphazard prize awards result in
only weak incentives to stop work on the flu and instead switch
to Zika.
But suppose this particular researcher can have it both
ways. For example, say the Zika vaccine prize program permits
multiple entries and promises a separate reward to each chemi-
cally distinct submission that appears to reduce the rate of Zika
infection. And suppose further that this researcher has the time
and resources to pursue both Zika and the flu simultaneously.
The decision to develop and submit a Zika vaccine is thus one
she can make independently of the decision to develop and sub-
mit a flu vaccine.
In this situation, the possibility of an undeserved award
does not diminish the researcher's marginal rewards for pursu-
ing Zika. -Consider each step of the researcher's decision-making
process sequentially. Putting aside ethical or reputational con-
cerns, the decision to submit a flu vaccine to the contest is an
easy one: she was planning to develop it anyway, and attempt-
ing to claim the prize has an expected value of $500,000.76 With
that decision made, the researcher must then choose whether to
develop an actual Zika vaccine. Doing so brings her a (separate)
60 percent chance of claiming the $1 million prize, for an
expected value of $600,000. In this case, that is both the abso-
lute and marginal reward available to her from seeking the Zika
prize legitimately. Notably, the magnitude of the marginal
reward here does not change depending on her chances of win-
ning the prize undeservedly. Without a mutually exclusive
choice at stake, erroneous rewards do not affect the researcher's
incentives to perform the desired activity.
76 The expected value is $500,000 because, as stated above, the researcher has a 50
percent chance of claiming the $1 million prize undeservedly.
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The difference between this case and the one presented in
the prior Section is the existence of opportunity cost. When an
actor faces a mutually exclusive choice, selecting one path
means forfeiting the ability to pursue the other paths. The value
that could have been obtained by selecting one of those other
paths is an opportunity cost.77 In the case of a vaccine researcher
who must pick between pursuing Zika or the flu, spurious
rewards for the flu raise the opportunity cost of selecting Zika,
thereby reducing the very marginal incentives that the prize
was intended to create. But, critically, this effect is present only
when the researcher must choose between one path and the
other. Without a mutually exclusive decision, there can be no
opportunity costs, 78 and the incentives to select the desired path
are the same whether or not undesired paths also receive some
unintended rewards. If the researcher can pursue both the flu
and Zika simultaneously, the incentive harm from spuriously
awarding the flu vaccine disappears.79
As a result, the consequences of an error depend significantly
on whether the prize is being offered in hopes of swaying a
mutually exclusive decision. Erroneous awards always impose
extra costs-either way the prize administrators have written
an unneeded $1 million check-but there is an additional incen-
tive harm present only in cases involving mutually exclusive
choices.
C. False Positives in the Patent System
Although the patent system is in some important ways dif-
ferent from the simple prize system described in the prior Section,
false positives have the same basic potential to reduce the mar-
ginal rewards offered to successful inventors. This Section revisits
the traditional account of error costs in the patent system in
77 See David W. Pearce, ed, The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 315 (4th ed
1992) ("Mhe opportunity cost of an action is the value of the foregone alternative action.").
78 See id ("Opportunity cost can only arise in a world where the resources available
to meet wants are limited. . . . If resources were limitless no action would be at the ex-
pense of any other . . . and the opportunity cost of any single action . .. would be zero.").
See also Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds, 6 New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics 198-201 (Macmillan 2008).
79 Though framed in different language, the criminal-deterrence literature has
struggled with a similar complication-that it is difficult to say what counts as a distinct
"opportunity" to commit a crime. See generally Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction
Lower Deterrence?, 35 J Legal Stud 327 (2006).
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light of this previously unappreciated harm caused by erroneous
patent grants.
The move from the prize context to the patent context intro-
duces a number of complications. One important wrinkle-
explored in detail in the next Part-is that there is not one
single thing (like curing Zika) patent law asks inventors to do.
Rather, the patent system presents inventors with an elaborate
framework of rewards (and, sometimes, punishments) to en-
courage them not simply to create inventions, but to invest in
specific kinds of research and development, to carry out that
work in acceptable ways, and to disclose the results of that work
to the public in a transparent and timely fashion. The multi-
faceted nature of the patent system's goals will result in several
caveats and conditions in the final analysis.80
But before introducing these nuances, a simple example
may help to illustrate in broad strokes how false positives can
affect incentives to invent. Consider a manager choosing how to
allocate a firm's research and development budget. One of the
manager's options (call it Plan A) is to pursue a program of
small-scale, incremental improvements to an existing technology.
By assumption, the capital outlay required to perform this kind
of work is small. And, because these will be improvements to an
existing technology, the firm may be able to use its incumbent
advantages to capture much of the benefits of its investment. As
a result, the firm may be able to recover the costs of Plan A
without patents even coming into the picture.81
The manager's other option (Plan B) is to pursue an ambi-
tious, disruptive technology. From a social perspective, this
groundbreaking project is a better use of resources than the pro-
gram of incremental improvements-Plan B costs more, but
promises much greater benefits. Nonetheless, because this
80 See Part III; Part IV.
81 For example, suppose the project will cost the firm $100,000 and that the firm
will enjoy private rewards of $500,000 through its incumbent/first-mover advantage. An
additional $200,000 of social benefits will not be captured by the firm. Putting aside
patent rewards and opportunity costs, the manager would choose to undertake Plan A,
because the private benefits exceed the private costs. The numbers selected throughout
this example are for purposes of illustration only. It should also be noted that this exam-
ple draws heavily from the "carrots and sticks" theory of obviousness, see Meurer and
Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 558-65 (cited in note 5); Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom
& Tech L Rev at 404-12 (cited in note 8), which bring complications of its own, see
Part III.A.
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would be a disruptive technology, the firm will not be able to
capture nearly as much benefit from its investment as it would
under Plan A. As a result, it is possible that without some form
of subsidy, the firm would not be able to recover the costs neces-
sary to bring about Plan B's groundbreaking innovation.82
One reason for offering patent protection is to encourage
managers like this one to undertake this latter, more innovative
kind of project. Patents do this, the theory goes, by offering
inventors who solve particularly challenging problems a share in
the benefits that they would not otherwise capture.8 3 The prom-
ise of a patent reward can push a socially valuable but privately
unprofitable project like Plan B into the black, thereby steering
private capital in the direction of more ambitious undertakings.84
But it might not be enough to make such inventions profita-
ble in a vacuum. If the firm manager can pick only one of these
two research paths, the question is not simply whether Plan B
can be made profitable, but whether it can be made more profit-
able than Plan A. In order to encourage groundbreaking innova-
tion, the patent value offered to highly inventive projects must
be sufficiently large to offset the opportunity costs of foregoing
less-inventive projects.85 This may require subsidizing Plan B at
a level that goes beyond making the project narrowly profitable
for the firm.
In addition to affecting the magnitude of the needed reward,
the goal of encouraging highly inventive over less-inventive pro-
jects heightens the need for accuracy in the administration of
that reward. No matter how generous the patent prize, the
marginal incentive to choose Plan B over Plan A will depend on
82 For example, suppose the project will cost the firm $300,000 and that the firm
will enjoy private rewards of $250,000 through its incumbent/first-mover advantage. An
additional $1 million of social benefits will not be captured by the firm. Without patent
protection or some other inducement, the manager would not choose to undertake this
project because the private costs exceed the private benefits.
83 See Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 412 (cited in note 8).
84 For example, suppose the offer of patent protection increases the firm's expected
return from Plan B by $100,000. Assuming no opportunity costs, the firm will now have
sufficient incentives to undertake the project, because the expected rewards ($350,000)
exceed the expected costs ($300,000).
85 And indeed, the patent protection described in note 84 provides inadequate in-
centives for the firm manager to select Plan B over Plan A. Plan A remains the more
profitable option to the firm, because it yields expected rewards of $500,000 and costs
only $200,000, while even with the promise of patent protection Plan B yields expected
rewards of $350,000 and costs $300,000.
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successful discrimination between the two projects. If the firm
manager expects that both the incremental improvement and
the disruptive technology will receive patent protection (and
that protection will have equal value),86 then the promise of
patent rights will result in no additional incentive to choose the
latter.87 Creating marginal incentives to pursue Plan B instead
of Plan A requires accuracy not only in awarding patents to
firms investing in projects like Plan B-something prior com-
mentary takes as a given-but also in denying patents to firms
investing in projects like Plan A.88
As with simple prizes, this effect depends on the existence of
a mutually exclusive choice. If the manager has the option of
pursuing both research paths simultaneously, then patent law
can fully satisfy its mission simply by making the groundbreak-
ing innovation path (Plan B) profitable for the firm, without
attending to its value in comparison to Plan A. If there is no
mutually exclusive choice at stake, marginal rewards are equal
to absolute rewards, and the conventional, one-sided incentives
model presented in Part L.A correctly balances errors between
false positives and false negatives.
But in cases in which a mutually exclusive choice is present,
the conventional account overlooks an important harm flowing
from patents that are mistakenly granted. When undeserving
inventions are given protection, the system fails to keep its
implicit, negative promise: that ordinary incremental im-
provements (like those of Plan A) will not be rewarded by a
grant of exclusive rights. In other words, false positives in-
crease the probability po that a future inventor will receive a
86 It's possible that a patent on the disruptive technology might naturally be worth
more than a patent on the incremental improvement. But the opposite could be true as
well, especially given the risks attendant to emergent, disruptive technologies. For a dis-
cussion of the consequences of this complication, see note 117.
87 For example, if the manager expects that both Plan A and Plan B will earn patent
protection worth $400,000, her calculation will remain unchanged.
88 For example, offering patent protection worth $400,000 to Plan B and no patent
protection to Plan A would, at last, create private incentives to pursue the more socially
valuable project. With the patent offer, Plan B's expected rewards ($650,000) would not
only exceed its expected costs ($300,000), but would also offer sufficiently large profits to
justify selecting Plan B over Plan A (which continues to offer $500,000 of rewards at a
cost of $200,000).
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patent undeservedly, thereby reducing marginal rewards to
pursue highly inventive projects in the future.89
Once these effects on marginal incentives are considered,
the potential outcomes of the decision to grant or deny patent
protection can be summarized as follows:
TABLE 2. TWO-SIDED INCENTIVES MODEL
Decision Invention Patentable Invention Not Patentable
Award - Imposes Ex Post Costs - Imposes Ex Post Costs
Patent (True Positive) -- Reduces Ex Ante Incentives(False Positive)
Deny - Reduces Ex Ante Incentives * No Ex Post Costs
Patent No Ex Post Costs (True Negative)(False Negative)
As Table 2 illustrates, the decision to award a patent (top
row) imposes ex post costs whether or not the patentability
requirements have been satisfied. But granting a patent unde-
servedly imposes an additional harm missing from the conven-
tional account: a reduction in future ex ante incentives. In this
way, a false positive is a doubly expensive mistake: it both im-
poses ex post costs and reduces ex ante incentives.
This framework is dubbed the "two-sided incentives" model,
because it recognizes that ex ante incentives are not only affect-
ed by errors in a single direction. Instead, when a mutually
exclusive choice is at stake, ex ante incentives depend on both
the successful granting of patents when they are deserved and
the successful denial of patents when they are not deserved.
Unsurprisingly, the addition of this new error cost term in
the case of a false positive changes how the patent system ought
to err in cases of uncertainty. As before, consider an objective
examiner applying the substantive patentability requirements
to the facts known to her to estimate the probability q that a
specific application satisfies those requirements. The task of
the patent policymaker is to set a threshold T' for all patent
89 As with false negatives, the relationship between any particular false positive
and future incentives is indirect-the question is how future prospective inventors can
expect to be treated. Ex ante harms do not come as an immediate result of individual
errors, but from changes to the overall expected rate of false positives and false nega-
tives. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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applications, such that applications with q > T' will result in
patent rights and applications with q equal to or below that
threshold will be denied patent rights.
The ideal probability threshold T' can be determined by
comparing the expected consequences of an action in either
direction. Whether deserved or not, granting a patent can be ex-
pected to impose ex post costs-these estimated incremental
costs remain C. But, depending on the merits of the case, there
may be an additional harm to granting as well. When the
patentability requirements were not actually satisfied, a grant
increases prospective inventors' expectations of receiving patent
rights without deserving them, thereby reducing marginal re-
wards in the future. The resulting diminished ex ante incentives
reduce the public benefits of the patent system similar to the
way false negatives do-call this analogous incentive harm from
a false positive IFP. The decision to grant thus incurs social costs
equal to C + (1 - q) * IFP-the ex post costs incurred as a result
of the patent grant, plus the probability-discounted harm to ex
ante incentives as a result of an incremental false positive.90
Consistent with the one-sided incentives model, denying a
patent results in no ex post costs, but produces an effect on ex
ante incentives that depends on whether or not that decision
was correct. If the invention really was patentable, a denial
reduces prospective inventors' expectations of receiving patent
rights when they deserve them in the future, and the public is
harmed as a result of these diminished ex ante incentives-the
same IFN term introduced above. The expected cost of denying
patent rights can thus be written as q * IFN-the probability-
discounted harm to future ex ante incentives in the event of a
false negative.
Patent rights should be awarded when the expected cost of
doing so is less than the expected cost of denying them. Under
the terms given above, this is satisfied when C = (1 - q) * IFP <
q * IFM, which means that a patent should be available if and only
if q > T', where
90 As with C and 'FN, the objective examiner is not permitted to make any application-
specific determinations of IFP. Concerns that certain kinds of patent applications may
affect costs or incentives in atypical ways must be channeled through generally applica-
ble patent law. See note 31.
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(3) T'= C+IFP
IFN+ IFP
Comparing this minimum probability of patentability T' to
the minimum probability of patentability T derived from the
one-sided incentives model reveals many similarities but also
some important differences. As before, the probability necessary
to justify awarding patent protection turns on the relationship
between the ex post costs C of granting an additional patent and
the public harm IFN from reduced ex ante incentives following an
erroneous denial. But the probability necessary to justify award-
ing patent protection also turns on the public harm IFP from
reduced ex ante incentives following an erroneous grant. This
term is missing from the conventional, one-sided incentives
model.
The probability of patentability necessary to justify patent
rights under the two-sided incentives model can be simplified sig-
nificantly with a few assumptions discussed in the next Section.
But even the unsimplified form of equation (3) reveals an intui-
tive principle that has often been overlooked by prior analysis of
errors in the patent system: it would be important to examine
and deny patent applications even if individual patents imposed
no ex post costs at all.
To see this, suppose that, somehow, the patent system was
able to offer privately valuable rights at zero public cost (that is,
C = 0). On these facts, the one-sided incentives model would call
for granting a patent anytime the probability of patentability
was greater than zero-essentially, giving a patent to anyone
who asked for one. But such promiscuity would be folly, because
giving everyone a patent regardless of merit would drive the
marginal reward for earning a patent down to zero too. 91 Doing
so would be the patent system equivalent of giving every student
in the class a gold star-a poor incentivization technique, even
in a classroom with an effectively limitless supply of gold stars.
The two-sided incentives model takes account of these
effects, and thus calls for enforcement of the patentability
requirements even as the ex post costs of patents disappear. So
long as false positives result in some harm to future incentives
91 To be clear, this practice would drive the marginal reward from the patent system
down to zero. Firms may nonetheless have nonpatent incentives to invest in invention.
See Hemel and Ouellette, 92 Tex L Rev at 310 (cited in note 11).
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(that is, IFP > 0), granting patents to everyone will never be the
right answer, even in a world of costless patents. As this model
recognizes, withholding rewards when they are undeserved is
not simply a matter of economizing ex post costs; it is critical for
producing the patent system's public benefits.
D. Reassessing the Balance of Errors
The incentive-reducing effects of false positives do more
than change how the patent system ought to err in extreme
hypotheticals, such as the zero-cost patent system discussed in
the prior Section. In fact, these previously overlooked effects can
have a significant impact on the optimal balance of errors across
a range of plausible scenarios.
Comparing the minimum probability threshold of the two-
sided incentives model T' to that of the one'sided incentives
model T, the former is consistently more demanding: a higher
probability of patentability will always be necessary to justify
patent rights once the incentive harms of false positives are taken
into account. This result relies on only a minimal set of assump-
tions: that both the incentive harm from a false positive and the
incentive harm from a false negative are greater than zero, and
that the costs and benefits of the patent system are such that it
ever makes sense to grant patents. 92 So long as the one-sided
incentives model would set the minimum probability of patenta-
bility somewhere below 100 percent, recognition of the incentive
harms of false positives would push that threshold higher still.
To say exactly how much more demanding the two-sided
incentives model will be than the one-sided incentives model,
92 Formally, these assumptions can be written as: (1) IFN > 0; (2) 'FP > 0; and
(3) 'FN > C. The first two assumptions mean that both false positives and false negatives
produce some harmful effect on future incentives (however small). The third assumption
is necessary to exclude the trivial case in which the ex ante incentive harm from denying
a deserved patent is smaller than the expected ex post costs of granting a patent-
trivial, because in that case both the one-sided and two-sided incentives models would
command denying patent rights regardless of the probability of patentability. To see that
the two-sided incentives model will generally demand more certainty than the one-sided
incentives model, begin with this third assumption that IFN > C. Observe that one can
manipulate the assumption algebraically so that 'FN * IFP > * IFP and 'FN > (C * IFP)IFN-
Likewise, C + IFP > C + (C * 'FP)I'FN, and then C + 'FP > (C * IFN + C * IFP)/'FN, so that
(C + Ip/IFN + IFP)> C/FN, which is equivalent to T' > T. Thus, on these assumptions,
the minimum probability of patentability under the two-sided incentives model T' will
always be greater than the minimum probability of patentability under the one-sided
incentives model T.
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one would need to make some assumptions about these values.
But across a range of plausible estimates for the incremental
costs and benefits of patent protection, the difference is a mate-
rial one. This can be shown by adopting the baseline case where
IFP = 'FN93 and plugging a few sample values of C/IFN into the
respective models:
TABLE 3. PROBABILITY-OF-PATENTABILITY THRESHOLDS
C Minimum probability of Minimum probability of
- validity required, one-sided validity required, two-sided
'FN incentives model 94 (%) incentives mode1 95 (N)
0.125 12.5 56.25
0.25 25.0 62.5
0.375 37.5 68.75
0.5 50.0 75.0
0.625 62.5 81.25
0.75 75.0 87.5
0.875 87.5 93.75
As this table illustrates, recognizing the effect of false posi-
tives on marginal rewards necessarily elevates the minimum
probability of patentability required to justify granting a patent.
For example, when an incremental patent's ex post costs are
low compared to the ex ante benefits that can be lost through
an error, as in the case in which C/IFN = 0.25, the one-sided in-
centives model counsels promiscuity: patents should be granted
if there is a 25 percent chance the requirements have been
93 The baseline case is the weakest form of the assumption that the incentive harm
from a false positive is at least as large as the incentive harm of a false negative. See
notes 96-105 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for this assumption). Relaxing
this assumption would affect the magnitude of these values, but would not change the
more general point that the two-sided incentives model is consistently more demanding.
94 These probability thresholds in this column are determined by plugging sample
values for C/IFN into equation (1).
95 These probability thresholds in this column are determined by plugging sample
values for C/IFN into equation (4), which is the simplified form of equation (3) for the case
where FP = 'FN. See note 96 and accompanying text.
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satisfied. On the same facts, the two-sided incentives model
would impose a significantly higher threshold to justify a patent:
a 62.5 percent probability of patentability. A similar effect occurs
in the moderate case, where C/IFN = 0.5: while the one-sided in-
centives model would suggest granting at the 50-50 point, the
two-sided incentives model would require at least 75 percent
probability of patentability. And even when the ex post costs of
an extra patent are high compared to the ex ante benefits that
can be lost through an error (that is, C/IFN = 0.75), both models
suggest heightened scrutiny, but the two-sided model again sug-
gests even more. A 75 percent probability of patentability would
be enough for the one-sided model, but 87.5 percent would be
required under the two-sided model.
These sample values hint at a larger conclusion of the two-
sided incentives model that can be both generalized and formal-
ly derived: if the incentive harm of a false positive is greater
than or equal to the incentive harm of a false negative, so that
IFP 'FN, then patent rights should be granted only if it is more
likely than not that they are deserved.
This can be demonstrated by simply plugging the weakest
form of the condition, IFP = IFN, into equation (3). In that case,
the minimum probability necessary to justify patent rights in
the two-sided incentives model T' becomes:96
(4) T' = 0.5 + C21 FN
The minimum probability of patentability to justify patent
rights T' is thus at least 50 percent, even when the ex post costs
of patent protection C are zero. Once patent rights impose ex
post costs (as they surely do), the minimum probability of
patentability to justify patent rights necessarily goes up from
there.
This conclusion depends, of course, on the condition that the
incentive harm of a false positive is greater than or equal to the
incentive harm of a false negative, that is, IFP 'FN. But there
96 The proof that T' takes this value when IFp = 'FN is trivial; equation (3) immedi-
ately reduces to equation (4) with this substitution. To confirm that T' goes only up from
there as IFP begins to exceed FN one can take the derivative of T' with respect to 'FP, or
simply plug in a test case. For example, when IFP = 1.5 * IFP, T' becomes 0.6 + C/(2.5 * IFN).
This is even more demanding than the threshold given by (4), with a minimum probabil-
ity of patentability of 60 percent when C = 0. Thus the minimum probability of patenta-
bility goes only up from 50 percent as IFP begins to exceed 'FN.
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are reasons to think that this will often be the case. First, notice
that both IFP and IFN represent a public harm caused by the
same basic mechanism. A false positive reduces marginal
rewards by increasing prospective inventors' expectation of the
probability of receiving a patent when they do not deserve one,
while a false negative reduces marginal rewards by reducing
prospective inventors' expectation of the probability of receiving
a patent when they do deserve one. If each kind of mistake
affects prospective inventors' probability estimates by an equiva-
lent amount, then each kind of mistake should have the same
effect on marginal rewards and impose the same harm on the
public.97 And, conversely, if one kind of mistake has a larger ef-
fect on prospective inventors' probability estimates than the
other, then that kind of mistake will impose a larger harm on
the public. The comparative magnitude of IFp and IFN is there-
fore really just a question of how false positives and false nega-
tives will affect prospective inventors' expectations of the chances
of experiencing that kind of mistake in the future.
Much about how inventors form their impressions about the
accuracy of the patent system remains unknown, but it seems
likely that false positives will tend to have a more dramatic effect
on prospective inventors' probability estimates than will false
negatives.98 By their nature, false positives tend to be the more
observable form of error.99 For example, if an application is wrong-
ly denied at the examination stage, competitors and the public
may never have any reason to notice.100 But if an application is
97 To see this, let E, represent the increase in po following a false positive, and let -A
represent the reduction in PA following a false negative. If (as stated in the main text)
each form of error affects future estimates of the relevant probability of error by an
equivalent amount, then EA = E0. Equation (2) shows that marginal rewards are given by
M = S(PA - po). Therefore, decreasing PA by EA or increasing po by EO will have an identi-
cal effect on marginal rewards-a reduction of S * e0. Note, however, that this depends on
the assumption that the resulting patent protection will have the same value S to the
inventor whether or not the patentability requirements were indeed satisfied, that is,
SA = So. This assumption seems reasonable as a general matter-given two patents of
equal enforceability, why would an inventor care if one was procured undeservedly?-but
it's possible it breaks down in the obviousness context. See note 117.
98 That is, EO > EA.
99 See Wagner, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2141 n 16 (cited in note 6).
100 In some cases, denied patent applications may be fully hidden from public view.
See 37 CFR § 1.14(a) (describing the limited circumstances in which an unpublished, aban-
doned application may be opened for inspection). However, because the vast majority of
applications are now published eighteen months after filing, rejected patent applications
are for the most part available for public inspection, if anyone cares to look. See note 28.
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wrongly granted, competitors and the public may see it quite a
bit.101 Similarly, if an issued patent is wrongly ruled invalid,
even once, collateral estoppel prevents its owner from asserting
it any further, and the patent may fall out of public view.102 But
if an issued patent is wrongly upheld, it lives on to appear in
headlines and in demand letters. False negatives are prone to
being forgotten, while false positives are prone to further public-
ity. And if the effect of a false positive on prospective inventors'
probability estimates is merely equal to the effect of a false neg-
ative on prospective inventors' probability estimates, then the
incentive harms from each form of error should generally be
equal too.103
Moreover, false positives in the patent system have an addi-
tional downside, one that provides an independent reason for
thinking that these errors will tend to do more harm to future
incentives than false negatives. As others have observed, in some
cases, patents awarded undeservedly will reduce the rewards left
over for true inventors, who must now share their royalties with
overlapping claimants.104 This harm is conceptually distinct-it
101 See Sawicki, 39 Fla St U L Rev at 767-68 (citei in note 6).
102 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402
US 313, 332-34, 350 (1971); Mendenhall v Barber-Greene Co, 26 F3d 1573, 1577-78
(Fed Cir 1994).
103 See note 97 and accompanying text. One potential complication here comes not
from patent law but from psychology: factors that are more colorful or distinctive tend to
wield a disproportionate influence on human behavior. See Shelley E. Taylor, The Avail-
ability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and
Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 190, 192
(Cambridge 1982). These salience effects make it possible that false negatives (perhaps
vivid, highly recallable injustices) could have a larger effect on inventors' perceptions of
rewards than false positives, despite the latter being more easily observable. See
Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J Reg 253,
261-63 (2011) (distinguishing salience from observability). But it is also possible that the
effect cuts the other way: perhaps it is jaw-dropping jury verdicts on the basis of seem-
ingly obvious inventions or threadbare disclosures that tend to capture prospective
inventors' imaginations. Suffice to say, then, that it is not obvious which way salience
effects will cut. Future work will be necessary to understand how inventors' perceptions
are affected by each form of error. See Part V.A.
104 See, for example, Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law
and Policy: Cases and Materials 609 (Lexis 6th ed 2013); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 Vand L Rev 1825, 1827-28 (2016) ("[W]hen an
applicant receives a patent on an uncertain research plan, it not only means that the
patent is not serving a useful teaching function-it also limits the patent incentive for
others to solve the problems necessary to obtain the completed invention."). An extreme
form of this dilution can be found in single-purse contests, in which giving the prize to
someone who does not deserve it necessarily means denying the prize to the one who
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can occur with or without the marginal reward effect described
above1O5-and, standing alone, it would be quite difficult to
quantify. But in conjunction with the marginal reward effect
described above, it lends additional weight to the proposition
that the incentive harm of a false positive will tend to be at least
as large as the incentive harm of a false negative.
It is important to note that, while the 50 percent minimum
probability-of-patentability threshold depends on the mutually
exclusive choice condition and the assumption that false positives
impair future incentives at least as much as false negatives,106 it
does not depend on any assessments of the public costs and ben-
efits of patent protection in general. Estimates of those costs and
benefits will affect how high above the 50 percent mark the
threshold for awarding patent rights should be set, but they do
not implicate the conclusion that patents should not be awarded
with any probability less than that. When these stated condi-
tions hold, the two-sided incentives model dramatically limits
the range of potential patentability thresholds, suggesting that
patents should be granted only when it appears more likely than
not that the patentability requirements have been satisfied.
Moreover, as a theoretical point, this conclusion can be gen-
eralized and transplanted back to the simple prize context from
which it was derived: when seeking to increase private incen-
tives to do X to the exclusion of Y through the promise of a fixed-
value prize with positive cost, the offeror should award that
prize only in cases in which it is more likely than not that the
applicant has indeed done X and not Y. Counterintuitively, this
minimal probability threshold applies without regard to either
does. In those cases, a false positive comes paired with a false negative, giving partici-
pants a direct interest in seeing that the prize is not erroneously bestowed on their com-
petitors. See Burstein and Murray, 29 Harv J L & Tech at 431-32 (cited in note 65).
105 For example, imagine the patent system has the ability to provide $1 million a
year of royalty value by granting rights to exclude in a new technology area. An error-
free patent system would award control of the entire royalty stream to the true inventor
of the technology. But instead, the patent system erroneously grants redundant rights to
exclude to both the true inventor and an impostor. Future incentives to invent are
reduced in two ways as a result of this mistake: the absolute reward for invention is cut
in half as a result of royalty sharing and the marginal reward for good behavior is
reduced as a result of an increased expectation of unjustified rewards for noninvention.
106 That is, that IFp 'FN-
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the value that the offeror places on incentivizing this conduct or
the cost of the prize itself.107
A number of questions remain to be settled, however, in
order to apply this rule in the patent context. Most importantly,
it is not clear whether (or when) the goals of the patent system
can be stated as "increasing incentives to do X to the exclusion of
Y." If this condition fails-if a goal of the patent system is as
simple as incentivizing X-then false positives do not reduce
marginal rewards, and the more relaxed, one-sided incentives
model of error costs is fully complete. As such, the optimal bal-
ance of errors in the patent system turns on a question that has
previously escaped notice: Are the patentability requirements
seeking to influence a mutually exclusive choice?
III. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CHOICES IN THE PATENT SYSTEM
As the prior Part explained, the question of how the patent
system ought to err in cases of uncertainty depends significantly
on whether the patentability requirements are designed to
influence a mutually exclusive choice. This Part explores this
condition in more detail.
The mutually exclusive choice condition turns out to be a
complex one, for the simple reason that the various patentability
requirements are designed to influence private actors at so
many distinct decision points. Clearly, one goal of the patent
system is to encourage invention over noninvention-a decision
explored in detail in Part III.A. But patent law also evinces an
interest in encouraging disclosure over nondisclosure, in stable
ownership over theft, and in licensing existing technologies over
wasteful reinvention. The legal rules affecting these "non-
inventive" choices are the focus of Parts III.B and III.C. Finally,
several patentability requirements are not intended to influence
private conduct at all and are, on their own terms, rooted entirely
in concerns about ex post costs. These cost-only doctrines are the
subject of Part IV.
107 As the cost of the prize rises in relationship to her interest in incentivizing X, the
offeror will want to demand even more certainty that the applicant has indeed done X.
The only assumption necessary to derive this 50 percent minimum probability threshold
is that false positives affect future applicants' perceptions of the false-positive rate as
much as false negatives affect future applicants' perceptions of the false-negative rate.
This would not be true if, for example, the prize offeror has the ability to secretly deny
deserving prize claimants without detection.
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A. To Invent or Not to Invent?
Perhaps the most basic decision patent law seeks to influence
is the choice between inventing and noninventing. Doctrinally,
marginal incentives to invent are primarily channeled through
the obviousness requirement-the condition that a patent shall
not be granted "if the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains."108 Though the modern
Patent Act frames this question in terms of obviousness, the
Supreme Court has interpreted this language as a codification
of the long-standing rule that it was necessary to make an
invention-not merely tinker with the skill of an "ordinary
mechanic"-in order to receive a patent.109
Although it is deeply intuitive (and universally accepted)
that patents should not be granted for obvious improvements,110
scholars disagree as to what, exactly, is at stake in this determi-
nation. Traditionally, obviousness was regarded as a cost-saving
tool-a way to avoid the ex post costs of patents for technologies
that would have been made soon enough with or without the
promise of patent protection.111 But in recent years, scholars
have suggested that the invention requirement may do more
108 35 USC § 103.
109 See Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 11-17 (1966); Hotchkiss v Greenwood,
52 US (11 How) 248, 265-67 (1850). Indeed, in international contexts, the obviousness
inquiry is framed as a requirement of an "inventive step." See Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Art 27(1) n 5, 33 ILM 1197, 1208 (1994)
("TRIPS"). The requirement that the inventor has actually made that step (as opposed to
hazarding a guess at it) is enforced through the enablement and written-description doc-
trines. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L Rev 123, 127-30,
147-48 (2006). These are discussed in more detail in the next Section.
110 See, for example, Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability,
7 High Tech L J 1, 14 (1992); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness
as Possession, 65 Emory L J 987, 1027-29 (2016); Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 156 (1989) (relating obviousness to novelty).
111 See Graham, 383 US at 11 ("The inherent problem [of the obviousness doctrine]
was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed
or devised but for the inducement of a patent."); Roberts v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 723 F2d
1324, 1345 (7th Cir 1983) (en banc) (Posner concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The balance tips against protection when the invention is the sort that was likely to be
made, and as soon, even if no one could have patented it."). See also Michael Abramowicz
and John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 Yale L J 1590, 1627-
31 (2011).
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than previously appreciated. This view, which Professors
Michael Meurer and Katherine Strandburg call the "carrots and
sticks" approach to obviousness,112 understands the doctrine not
simply as a tool for avoiding the costs of unnecessary patents,
but also as a mechanism for influencing the selection of research
projects in the first place. In their telling, the prohibition on
patenting obvious inventions works to nudge researchers away
from incremental improvements of moderate social value and in
the direction of groundbreaking initiatives having greater social
value.113 Awarding patents only to nonobvious inventions
increases the probability that nonobvious inventions will indeed
be produced.
Although not stated in these terms, the carrots-and-sticks
approach to obviousness relies on a certain mutual exclusivity
among projects. Indeed, Meurer and Strandburg introduce their
theory by asserting that the question facing the researcher is
not, "Shall I produce this invention?" but rather "Which research
path shall I pursue?"114 It is this constraint that leads to the risk
that awarding noninventive projects may counterproductively
reduce the number of inventive projects.115 If it were otherwise-
if inventors had the ability to pursue every project with positive
expected value-there would be no risk of a project of moderate
social value "squeezing out" a project of higher social value.116
Because the carrots-and-sticks view is predicated on a public
interest in influencing a private mutually exclusive choice, the
same reasoning suggests that obviousness determinations ought
to be balanced using the two-sided incentives model developed
above. A granted patent imposes ex post costs C whether or not
the underlying invention was obvious. But a patent granted on
an obvious invention also reduces marginal rewards to create
112 See Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 549-50 (cited in note 5).
See also Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 412-13 (cited in note 8).
113 Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 561-62 (cited in note 5). See
also Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 412-13 (cited in note 8).
114 Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 549 (cited in note 5).
115 See id at 561-62. See also Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 409-11 (cited
in note 8) (noting that, in some cases, a system that rewards noninventive projects could
yield the same outcomes as having no patent system at all); Amy Kapczynski and Talha
Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L J 1900,
1945-46 (2013) (noting that patent protection can further distort incentives to invest in
projects of lower social value).
116 See Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 405-07 (cited in note 8).
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nonobvious inventions in the future, resulting in some loss of
public benefits IFP. This incentive harm from false positives is
missing from the conventional approach to error costs, and leads
to the conclusion that a higher probability of nonobviousness
should be required to justify patent rights than was previously
appreciated.117
But not everyone accepts the carrots-and-sticks understand-
ing of obviousness. In fact, a number of commentators continue
to analyze the doctrine exclusively through the lens of ex post
costs. According to the dominant "inducement" approach to obvi-
ousness, the purpose of the requirement is simply to avoid the
costs of patent protection for inventions that would have been
created soon enough with or without the promise of a patent. The
doctrine exists, in this view, only to "weed[] out those inventions
which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement
of a patent."118 As Professors Michael Abramowicz and John
Duffy explain, denying patent protection in cases in which non-
patent incentives were already sufficient "costs society nothing
... and saves society from needlessly suffering the well-known
negative consequences of patents."119
Implicit in this rejection of the carrots-and-sticks view is a
lack of mutual exclusivity when it comes to the selection of
research projects. The standard inducement view examines the
117 Note, however, that in the case of obviousness, it's possible that the certainty
required to justify patent rights could be less than 50 percent, even if the two-sided
incentives model applies. As discussed above, the 50 percent minimum depends on the
condition that the incentive harm from a false positive is greater than or equal to the
incentive harm from a false negative, that is, IFP 'FN- It may be reasonable to assume
that condition as a general matter, as false positives tend to be more observable than
false negatives. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text. But obviousness presents a
complication, because it is possible (though not inevitable) that the private value So of a
patent on an obvious development may tend to be smaller than the private value SA of a
patent on a nonobvious invention, even if both patents are equally likely to be enforceable
in court. If this is the case, then a change of equal magnitude to the probability PA of get-
ting a patent deservedly and the probability po of getting a patent undeservedly would
not have the same effect on marginal rewards, potentially causing the 1F, 'FN condition
to fail. When this occurs, the incentive harm of false positives still pushes in the direc-
tion of greater scrutiny (assuming a patent on an obvious improvement has some value),
but the 50 percent minimum probability threshold does not necessarily hold.
118 Graham, 383 US at 11.
119 Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1594 (cited in note 111). See also Merges,
7 High Tech L J at 29 (cited in note 110). On this account, the obviousness doctrine may
play a particularly important cost-saving function when an unexpected development
makes a new technology suddenly possible. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect
Theory of Patents, 71 U Chi L Rev 439, 505 (2004).
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expected costs and benefits of potential inventions in isolation,
and without considering the opportunity costs inventors might
face by selecting one project over the other.10 As a result, the in-
ducement approach has the potential to deny patent protection
to some of the most socially valuable projects (because, in isola-
tion, they are already privately profitable), while granting pa-
tent protection to projects of only moderate social value (be-
cause, in isolation, they are not). If the choice of research
projects is mutually exclusive, such a scheme may not only deny
subsidies to the projects most in need of encouragement, but
actively steer prospective inventors in precisely the wrong
direction.121
Unfortunately, little is actually known about whether and
when inventors must make mutually exclusives choices about
which projects to pursue. The proponents of the carrots-and-
sticks view of obviousness simply assume the existence of such a
constraint.122 (For their part, those who do not subscribe to the
carrots-and-sticks view similarly assume the absence of such a
constraint.)123 And there are reasons to wonder why an inventor-
or, at least, a firm that employs inventors-would not be able to
pursue two positive-value projects simultaneously. Increasing
cost of capital provides at least one theoretical answer,124 as does
the long lead time required to train cutting-edge researchers in
some fields.125 But these theoretical possibilities do not tell us
120 See Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1663-67 (cited in note 111) (noting
that, under the inducement standard, "whether an invention is obvious depends on how
costly an experiment would be and the probability that the experiment would be successful").
121 See Kapczynski and Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1945-46 (cited in note 115).
122 See Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 549 (cited in note 5).
This mutual exclusivity condition is similarly an explicit precondition in the analysis of
Professor Glynn S. Lunney Jr. See Lunney, 7 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 408 (cited
in note 8).
123 See Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1624 (cited in note 111); Lemley, 83
Tex L Rev at 1057 (cited in note 22) ("Economic theory offers no justification for award-
ing creators anything beyond what is necessary to recover their average total costs.").
124 See Kapczynski and Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1945 (cited in note 115).
125 Note that, in the case of obviousness, the question of mutual exclusivity must be
assessed at a social level: Does one firm's selection of an obvious project over a nonobvious
project preclude others from pursuing the nonobvious project in its stead? Even if a par-
ticular firm has only so many engineers with so many hours in a day, the choice of
research project is not necessarily mutually exclusive if a different firm can pursue the
competing project with equivalent speed and effectiveness.
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whether capacity constraints on project selection are the excep-
tion or the rule, or indeed whether they ever occur at all.126
These questions will not be settled here. But the discussion
above reveals that they have greater consequence than has been
previously appreciated. Without a complete picture of the value
of accuracy in the patent system, the conflict between the
inducement view and the carrots-and-sticks view has only subtle
implications for obviousness doctrine. (Neither the inducement
nor the carrots-and-sticks view of obviousness leads to a univer-
sally stricter substantive standard than the other-the two
schools simply teach that different considerations should be taken
into account.)127 But once the effects of false positives are consid-
ered, these two views of the doctrine lead to very different con-
clusions about how that doctrine should be applied in cases of
uncertainty.
B. To Disclose or Not to Disclose?
Another decision patent law seeks to influence is an inven-
tor's choice to either publicly disclose her invention or keep it
secret. Although many scholars consider the goal of encourag-
ing disclosure to be of secondary importance, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly placed it on an equal plane with the goal
126 Additional complications lurk deeper still. Although the obviousness of a project
is, legally, a binary inquiry-an invention is either obvious or it is not-the social value
of various projects can surely range more broadly. Work that falls just short of the obvi-
ousness standard might nonetheless yield important public benefits, just as work that
far exceeds that threshold might yield greater benefits still. If the goal of patent law is to
push inventors toward increasingly ambitious projects (and not just to some minimally
inventive threshold), then the costs of errors will depend on the magnitude of the devia-
tion from the legal standard rather than just the presence or absence of a mistake. Errors
close to the line of patentability might be much less significant than errors on either end
of the spectrum. This distinction is not reflected in patent doctrine (and so is beyond the
scope of this Article, which takes substantive patent law as a given, see notes 32-34 and
accompanying text), but it would likely be an important consideration for any initiative
to increase the accuracy of obviousness determinations. See Christopher Buccafusco, et
al, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws' Creativity Thresholds, 92 Tex L
Rev 1921, 1942-43 (2014) (describing the potential for achievement thresholds to impair
performance).
127 The inducement view keys off two variables, the private costs and the private
benefits of a project prior to patent incentives. By contrast, the carrots-and-sticks view
focuses on positive externalities-that is, the magnitude of any benefits not captured by
the inventor in the absence of patent protection. Thus, under either view, obviousness
turns out to be a highly fact-specific and nuanced determination.
1262 [84:1217
The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System
of encouraging invention,128 even suggesting that subsidizing
disclosure may be the principal justification for having a patent
system at all.129
This preference for disclosure is the reason patent law
requires applicants to provide a "written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art ... to make and use the same."130
Together, these obligations are called the "disclosure" require-
ments, 131 and the Supreme Court has long held that compliance
with them is an essential part of the "quid pro quo" for the
inventor's rights to exclude.132
On their face, the disclosure requirements are intended to in-
fluence a mutually exclusive choice: whether or not to release to
the public all the details necessary to practice the newly invented
128 For example, in 1944 the Court explained that "[a]s a reward for inventions and
to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an
inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret." Universal Oil Products
Co v Globe Oil & Refining Co, 322 US 471, 484 (1944). Similar statements can be found
as early as 1832. See Grant v Raymond, 31 US (6 Pet) 218, 247 (1832).
129 See Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp, 416 US 470, 481 (1974):
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to
the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to
the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal
that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of
exclusive use.
See also Sinclair & Carroll Co v Interchemical Corp, 325 US 327, 330-31 (1945) ("The
primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advance-
ment of the arts and sciences. . . . [I]t is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to dis-
close."); Grant, 31 US (6 Pet) at 247 (describing disclosure as "the advantage for which
the privilege [of patenting] is allowed, and [] the foundation of the power to issue the
patent"). For a scholarly defense of patent law's disclosure goal, see Jeanne C. Fromer,
Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L Rev 539, 547-51 (2009).
130 35 USC § 112(a). Additionally, the inventor is required to set forth what she con-
templates as the "best mode" of carrying out the invention. 35 USC § 112(a). In recent
years, this latter requirement has been rendered essentially unenforceable. After the
AIA, failure to disclose the best mode is no longer grounds to invalidate a patent in liti-
gation. See AIA § 15(a), 125 Stat at 328, 35 USC § 282(b)(3)(A). Moreover, the position of
the PTO is that best-mode rejections are rarely proper in ex parte proceedings (such as
examination). See Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
§ 2165.03 (Nov 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JQ35-DWBX (detailing the require-
ments for rejection for failing to disclose the best mode).
131 See Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 Loyola U Chi L J
369, 370 n 2 (2013).
132 Kewanee Oil, 416 US at 484 (emphasis omitted). See also Universal Oil, 322 US
at 484.
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technology. At the start, disclosure is technically optional, in the
sense that participation in the patent system is voluntary. An
inventor is free, after all, to forego patent protection and instead
take her chances by relying on trade secrecy protection.133 But
having weighed the comparative benefits of secrecy and patent
protection and opted for the latter, an inventor is not supposed
to be able to keep one foot in the other boat.134 Enforcing the dis-
closure requirements thus guards against applicants' "selfish
desire to obtain patent protection without making a full disclo-
sure,"135 furthering patent law's "ultimate goal" of moving "new
designs and technologies into the public domain."136
Because the disclosure requirements are intended to influ-
ence this mutually exclusive choice, the two-sided incentives
model is the appropriate framework for enforcing the require-
ments in situations of uncertainty. As before, a granted patent
imposes ex post costs C, whether or not the disclosure require-
ments have actually been satisfied.137 But a patent granted
despite inadequate disclosure also reduces marginal rewards to
make complete disclosures in the future, resulting in some loss
of public benefits IFP -138This incentive harm from false positives is
missing from the conventional approach to error costs, and sug-
gests that greater confidence that an application has satisfied the
133 See Kewanee Oil, 416 US at 487-88.
134 See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competi-
tion, 92 Notre Dame L Rev 1611, 1614-17 (2017). This, at least, is the theory. In prac-
tice, various loopholes sometimes permit inventors to have some of the benefits of both
forms of protection. See id at 1617-18.
135 Application of Nelson, 280 F2d 172, 184 (CCPA 1960), overruled on other
grounds by Application ofKirk, 376 F2d 936 (CCPA 1967).
136 Bonito Boats, 489 US at 151. See also Fromer, 94 Iowa L Rev at 589-93 (cited in
note 129) (calling for increased enforcement of the disclosure requirements).
137 An additional consideration may further strengthen the conclusion that greater
scrutiny should be applied to the disclosure requirements: it seems plausible that
patents with inadequate disclosure may on average impose higher ex post costs CND than
a patent with complete disclosure CD. See Ouellette, 69 Vand L Rev at 1827 (cited in note
104) ("When an applicant presents data showing that an invention works but obfuscates
key steps of the method, the public loses out on the teaching function that a clearer pro-
tocol would have provided."). This effect would be difficult to quantify, but, to the extent
that CND > CD, it would tend to push the minimum probability of patentability necessary
to justify patent rights even higher.
138 Note that the potential complication that a deserved patent may be inherently
more valuable than an undeserved patent, see note 117, does not apply here, because
(unlike obviousness) there is no reason to think that a patent with inadequate disclosure
will be less valuable to an inventor than a patent with adequate disclosure. In fact, it
seems plausible that the opposite would be true.
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disclosure requirements should be required to justify patent
rights. 139
C. To Build, Buy, or Steal?
Another decision that patent law seeks to influence is an
inventor's choice to either rely on an existing solution or set out
to invent something new. Generally, of course, patent rights are
reserved for things that did not exist before.140 But in some situ-
ations reinvention is preferable or even necessary, a fact patent
law quietly concedes through various limits on the universe of
prior knowledge that can disqualify an invention for patent
protection.141
The requirement that an invention be new in order to get a
patent is found in 35 USC § 102, which states that no patent can
be granted if the claimed invention was, prior to the patent fil-
ing, "patented, described in a printed publication, or in public
use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public."142 If a single
qualifying prior reference or activity, anywhere in the world,
describes or contains the complete invention, the invention is
said to be "anticipated," and protection is denied.143
139 Some readers might wonder about the observability of false positives when it
comes to the disclosure requirements, because, by its nature, nondisclosure seems like a
difficult thing for outsiders to detect. But it must be remembered that patent law's dis-
closure requirements are for the most part objective, not subjective. The question is not
whether the applicant disclosed everything she knew about an invention, but whether
she disclosed enough to allow those skilled in the art "to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F2d 731, 737 (Fed Cir 1988). This
requirement is tested by reading the patent specification, see id at 735, so the public has
the same opportunity to observe false positives on disclosure grounds as it does false pos-
itives on other grounds. The one exception is the best-mode requirement, which does
require an inquiry into the inventor's subjective state of mind. See Chemcast Corp v Arco
Industries Corp, 913 F2d 923, 925-26 (Fed Cir 1990). But, as noted above, best mode has
recently been rendered an essentially unenforceable requirement. See note 130.
140 See Alexander Milburn Co v Davis-Bournonville Co, 270 US 390, 402 (1926)
("The fundamental rule ... is that the patentee must be the first inventor.").
141 See Gayler v Wilder, 51 US (10 How) 477, 496-97 (1850) ("In the case thus pro-
vided for, the party who invents is not strictly speaking the first and original inventor.
... Yet his patent is valid if he discovered it by the efforts of his own genius, and be-
lieved himself to be the original inventor.").
142 35 USC § 102(a)(1). In some cases, 35 USC § 102(b)(1) carves out activity that
would otherwise qualify as prior art under § 102(a)(1).
143 See Atlas Powder Co v Ireco, Inc, 190 F3d 1342, 1346 (Fed Cir 1999). Prior to
statutory amendments enacted in 2011 and effective in 2013, use and sale activities were
disqualifying only if they took place in the United States. See 35 USC § 102(a)-(b)
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The most basic choice these requirements seek to influence
is the decision to seek a patent (or not) on an invention that the
applicant copied from someone else. Indeed, when the require-
ment of absolute novelty admits of an exception, it is always on
the condition that the inventor applied for a patent with a good-
faith belief in the invention's originality. When the duplication
isn't so innocent-when an applicant acquired the technology
from the true inventor rather than inventing it herself-patent
protection is categorically denied.144 In fact, seeking patent pro-
tection on a technology knowingly taken from another is one of
the few transgressions in patent law that can lead not only to
denial by the patent office but also to criminal prosecution.145
The mutually exclusive choice here is straightforward and clear:
at a minimum, patent law seeks to deter would-be thieves from
claiming ownership of things they know were invented by others.
(2006). Additionally, the prior art must be enabling in order to be anticipatory. See
Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 314 F3d 1313, 1354 (Fed Cir 2003).
144 See Gayler, 51 US at 496-97 ("[H]is patent is valid if he ... believed himself to
be the original inventor.") (emphasis added). Until recently, a separate statutory provi-
sion prohibited granting a patent in cases in which the invention was taken from another.
See 35 USC § 102(f) (2006) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... he did not
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented."); Patent Act of 1870 § 61, 16
Stat 198, 208. This long-standing provision was removed by the AIA, but the position of
the PTO is that stolen inventions are implicitly barred by 35 USC § 101, which states
that "[w]hoever invents or discovers ... may obtain a patent therefor" (emphasis added).
See Dennis Crouch, With 102() Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35
U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but Not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived
Information (Patently, Oct 4, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/ETZ3-5M64 (discussing
the AIA's changes to the inventorship requirement).
145 An inventor seeking patent protection has been required to submit a sworn
statement that he or she "believes himself or herself to be the original inventor . . . of a
claimed invention." 35 USC § 115(b)(2). An inventor who submits this oath with actual
knowledge that the invention was taken from another would be making a knowingly
false statement to a federal agency, raising the specter of criminal fines or up to five
years in prison. See 35 USC § 115(i); 18 USC § 1001. See also Irving Kayton, John F.
Lynch, and Richard H. Stern, Fraud in Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges,
43 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 79-80 (1974). Though these prosecutions are exceedingly rare as a
practical matter, see Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming Is Criminal *20-22 (Cornell Law
School Research Paper No 16-35, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/JV3R-NZDE, the in-
clusion of a requirement to make a "true inventor" or "original inventor" statement
under penalty of criminal sanctions evinces a clear intent to dissuade inventors from
knowingly filing for undeserved rights. In addition, an applicant who files a claim she
knows to be anticipated may later face antitrust liability, see Walker Process Equipment,
Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp, 382 US 172, 174 (1965), and sanctions for
inequitable conduct, see Ohio Willow Wood Co v Alps South, LLC, 813 F3d 1350, 1357,
1360 (Fed Cir 2016).
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But the novelty rules do much more. In fact, typically an ap-
plicant's actual knowledge is irrelevant to the novelty inquiry, for
the simple reason that she is "presumed to know" all of the prior
art anyway. 146 This presumptive knowledge will not trigger the
patent system's more drastic penalties,147 but it will work to deny
protection to an applicant who believes, wrongfully but faithfully,
that she was the first to invent a particular technology.148
A rule that holds inventors responsible for prior art they did
not know about cannot be explained as a mechanism for
discouraging theft, because it applies equally in cases involving
no theft at all. Instead, this legal fiction appears to be rooted in
concerns about the cost of reinvention. As Professors Robert
Merges and John Duffy have explained, in cases in which a rea-
sonable amount of searching would have revealed a known solu-
tion, it is preferable for the prospective inventor to search and
find that solution rather than waste time and money re-creating
it.14 Denying patent protection based on what an inventor could
have reasonably discovered encourages prospective inventors to
search existing solutions before setting out to make something
new, reducing the risk of wasteful reinvention in the future.150
On this understanding, the novelty requirements are
designed not only to deter theft but also to influence an addi-
tional mutually exclusive choice: whether or not to perform a
reasonably diligent prior art search before attempting to create
146 See Evans v Eaton, 16 US (3 Wheat) 454, 496 (1818). Judge Learned Hand was
characteristically forthright on the implausibility of this presumption, explaining, "[W]e
must suppose the inventor to be endowed, as in fact no inventor ever is endowed; we are
to impute to him knowledge of all that is not only in his immediate field, but in all fields
nearly akin to that field." International Cellucotton Products Co v Sterilek Co, 94 F2d 10,
13 (2d Cir 1938).
147 See Kimberly-Clark Corp v Johnson & Johnson, 745 F2d 1437, 1450 (Fed Cir 1984).
148 More recently, the legal fiction of presumed knowledge has been replaced by a
rule that the inventor's knowledge is simply irrelevant to novelty. See id at 1454.
149 See Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 401-02 (cited in note 104). See
also Donald S. Chisum, 1 Chisum on Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Patentability,
Validity, and Infringement § 3.01 (Matthew Bender 2016); William M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 303 (Harvard 2003).
150 See Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 401-02 (cited in note 104). See
also Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J
Legal Stud 307, 316-17 (1994) (observing that accuracy ex post can encourage partici-
pants to inform themselves ex ante). As in other areas of law, knowledge is presumed to
create incentives to acquire actual knowledge. See Richard R. Powell, 14 Powell on Real
Property § 82.02[1][d][iii] (Lexis 2000) (discussing constructive notice in title registration
regimes).
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something new. Sometimes, of course, an inventor who fails to
search will emerge unscathed-the novelty rules bite only if
anticipating prior art turns out to exist.151 But in cases in which
a reasonably diligent search would have turned up anticipating
prior art, enforcement of the novelty requirement increases
marginal incentives to perform such a search in the future.152
When the inventor knew or should have known about the prior
art in question, the two-sided incentives framework is the
appropriate model for balancing errors in the adjudication of the
novelty requirement.
Though the matter is complicated, it appears that at least
several of the private decisions that patent law seeks to influ-
ence have the potential to be mutually exclusive. The two-sided
incentives model is thus appropriate, at least in some cases, in
the application of 35 USC § 112's disclosure requirements, 35
USC § 102's novelty requirements, and (arguably) 35 USC
§ 103's nonobviousness requirement.
To be clear, all of these doctrines may also have important
roles to play in limiting the ex post costs of the patent system.
Any legal basis for denying patent protection has the potential
to make the patent system cheaper by avoiding deadweight losses
and transaction costs. 153 But the presence of mutually exclusive
151 In fact, the relationship between an inventor's decision to search and the conse-
quences for her patent rights is indirect in two ways. First, patent law does not formally
require applicants to search the prior art at all. See Nordberg, Inc v Telesmith, Inc, 82
F3d 394, 397 (Fed Cir 1996). The failure to do so is relevant only if some anticipating
prior art actually existed. Second, even in cases in which an inventor did search, it is
possible that her work may nonetheless be anticipated by prior art that was actually im-
possible for her to find. See Part IV.B.
152 If an inventor did search and in fact found the existing solution, she becomes an
inventor with actual knowledge of anticipating prior art, and the novelty requirements
are intended to dissuade her from seeking an invention she knows she does not deserve.
See notes 144-45 and accompanying text. Admittedly, some readers might dispute
Merges and Duffy's "incentives to search" explanation for the prior art rules, and instead
understand these rules as being rooted exclusively in concerns about ex post costs. If this
alternative position were adopted, only cases of actual knowledge would trigger the more
demanding, two-sided incentives model, and all other novelty disputes would call for the
traditional one-sided model. See Part IV.B.
153 In addition to these generic benefits from patent denial, there may also be some
ex post cost savings that are doctrine specific. For example, individual denials on novelty
grounds may protect those who have relied on the public domain. Likewise, enforcing the
nonobviousness requirement can protect against patent clutter, preventing the transaction
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choices gives the adjudication of these doctrines additional sig-
nificance. Whatever degree of scrutiny concerns about ex post
costs might already justify, the incentive harm of false positives
pushes the optimal balance of errors toward additional skepti-
cism of patent claims.
These doctrines are central to patent law-indeed, they are
some of the most commonly litigated grounds of invalidity.154
But, critically, they are not all of patent law. There are other
patentability requirements as well, and they do not map so neatly
onto mutually exclusive choices confronted by prospective inven-
tors. The next Part introduces several requirements of patent
law that seem not to be directed at inventor incentives at all.
IV. CosT-ONLY DOCTRINES
The prior Part introduced a number of private decisions that
patent law seeks to influence, showing how some of the most
prominent patentability requirements appear to be directed at
mutually exclusive choices. This Part explores the negative
spaces of that analysis: the patentability requirements that, on
their own terms, do not claim any goal of influencing future
inventor conduct. For these doctrines, the mutually exclusive
choice condition is lacking, thus making the traditional, one-
sided incentives model the appropriate tool for balancing errors
in adjudication.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
One example of a patent doctrine that is explicitly not root-
ed in a goal of influencing inventor conduct is the patentable
subject matter requirement. The patentable subject matter re-
quirement is rooted in 35 USC § 101, which states that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
costs of the patent system from compounding through a profusion of patents on small,
unimportant improvements. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent
Law, 22 Harv J L & Tech 75, 81 (2008). See also Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Pol-
icy at 609 (cited in note 104).
154 See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 Tex L Rev 1769, 1789 (2014) (noting that
enablement, novelty, and obviousness accounted for 68 percent of summary judgment
observations).
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useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor."lm
These categories of prima facie eligibility-process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter-have long been inter-
preted broadly.156 But they have also been subjected to several
judicially created exceptions, and it is here that most patentable
subject matter controversies take place. Though these limita-
tions are not found in the text of 35 USC § 101, the Supreme
Court has denied protection to 'laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas."157 In the last decade, these
judicially created exceptions have been the subject of four
Supreme Court opinions,158 and they remain an exceedingly ac-
tive topic of litigation.159
Why are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas categorically excluded from patent protection? Because, the
Court has explained, "Phenomena of nature, . . . mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scien-
tific and technological work."160 Exactly because they are so criti-
cal for future invention, there is a concern that "monopolization
of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it."161 In
short, allowing such patents would "risk disproportionately
tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their
use in the making of further discoveries."162
At heart, then, the reason for excluding these kinds of in-
ventions is out of concern for the ex post costs of affording them
patent protection.83 Commentators largely agree that patents in
155 35 USC § 101.
156 See Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308-09 (1980).
157 Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593, 60142 (2010), quoting Chakrabarty, 447 US at 309.
158 See Alice Corp Pty Ltd v CLS Bank International, 134 S Ct 2347, 2354 (2014);
Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 S Ct 2107, 2116 (2013);
Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 566 US 66, 70-71 (2012);
Bilski, 561 US at 609-12. See also Laboratory Corp of America Holdings v Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc, 548 US 124, 125-28 (2006) (Breyer dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(outlining the rationale behind the "laws of nature" exception).
159 See Robert R. Sachs, Two Years after Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a "Minor
Case" (Part 1) (Bilski Blog, June 16, 2016), archived at http://perma.ccN8FC-GXAH.
160 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63, 67 (1972).
161 Mayo, 566 US at 71.
162 Id at 73.
163 See id at 88 (comparing costs of a patent grant to inventor's contribution). Similar
judicial concerns date back to the nineteenth century. See Christopher Beauchamp,
Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 Stan Tech L Rev 257, 270-71 (2013).
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the "exceptional" categories would be staggeringly expensive.164
Given these substantial costs, the benefits are simply too small
to justify granting patent protection, even when the other re-
quirements of patentability have been met.165
It is important to notice what this explanation for the
patentable subject matter exclusions doesn't say. The Court has
never suggested that research into these topics lacks benefit-if
anything, the justices have stressed the great social value that
these kinds of projects can produce.166 No commentator, appar-
ently, has suggested that the laws of nature, physical phenome-
na, or abstract ideas are disfavored research topics.167 The goal
of denying patent protection is not to steer inventors to better
uses of their time. The problem is simply that it would be pro-
hibitively expensive to afford patent protection to certain foun-
dational technologies.168
164 See, for example, Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law at 305-06 (cited in note 149); Golden, 89 Tex L Rev at 1070-74 (cited in
note 4); Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility-A Disease and a Cure, 84 S Cal L
Rev 387, 428-29 (2011). See also David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent
Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 Temple L Rev 181,
203 (2009) (questioning whether patent rights are necessary to produce innovation in
certain areas).
165 See Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at
305-06 (cited in note 149); Golden, 89 Tex L Rev at 1070-74 (cited in note 4).
.166 See Mayo, 566 US at 85-87. See also Laboratory Corp, 548 US at 126 (Breyer
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
167 See Mark A. Lemley, et al, Life after Bilski, 63 Stan L Rev 1315, 1329 (2011);
Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 577 (cited in note 5) (contrasting the
patentable subject matter requirement with the obviousness requirement). Some have
argued that an additional reason not to grant patents on fundamental ideas is that the
patent system would not be very effective at rewarding such early-stage inventions any-
way. See, for example, Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law at 307 (cited in note 149) (explaining that rewards offered for technologies that
are far from commercial development will be small); Bilski, 561 US at 651-52 (Stevens
concurring in the judgment). But this does not imply that the projects themselves lack
value, only that the patent system will not be an effective tool to reward them. Another
view is that the patentable subject matter requirement screens out inventions that other
patent doctrines would struggle to distinguish. See Golden, 89 Tex L Rev at 1067-68
(cited in note 4). Like the other explanations, this view of the requirement discerns no
goal of influencing inventors' future selection of research projects. To be clear, however,
none of this rules out the possibility that someone might (in the future) develop a con-
vincing theory of patentable subject matter that implicates a mutually exclusive choice.
Such a choice is simply missing from the accounts prominently presented to date.
168 Historically, § 101 (and its predecessor provision) was used to discourage private
research in certain fields, through the exclusion of inventions that were "frivolous or
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society." See Lowell v Lewis,
15 F Cases 1018, 1019 (CC D Mass 1817). Justice Joseph Story famously imagined a
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Because the contemporary patentable subject matter
requirement is rooted only in concerns for ex post costs, the con-
sequences for future incentives in these determinations are dis-
tinctly one-sided. Erroneous denials reduce incentives to invent,
disclose, and so on. But erroneous grants cause no corollary
incentive harm, because the patent system claims no goal of
steering inventors toward patentable subject matter in the first
place. The downside of an erroneous patent grant on patentable
subject grounds is only the ex post costs resulting from that par-
ticular grant. The traditional, one-sided incentives model thus
remains the correct approach for balancing errors in determina-
tion of the patentable subject matter exclusions.
The appropriateness of the one-sided incentives model here
can be reinforced by returning to the hypothetical cost-free
patent system discussed above.169 If, somehow, patents imposed
no ex post costs (that is, C = 0), the one-sided incentives model
would counsel granting patents to anyone who asks for one,
regardless of validity. And, in the case of the patentable subject
matter exclusions, this conclusion would be entirely correct. If
patents on laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas came at no cost to the public at all, the stated rationale for
excluding these inventions would be rendered hollow.
B. Obscure Prior Art
While the patentable subject matter requirement is categor-
ically and exclusively rooted in ex post costs, there are other doc-
trines that may be explained by ex post costs in some circum-
stances and ex ante incentives in other circumstances. This
Section revisits the novelty requirement as one example of a
doctrine with blended purposes that can change depending on
the facts of the case.
number of colorful examples of inventions that ought to be denied patent protection on
these grounds, such as those designed "to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination." Id. The Federal Circuit has disavowed this doctrine, see
Juicy Whip, Inc v Orange Bang, Inc, 185 F3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed Cir 1999), leaving the
judgment to Congress as to which kinds of research should be excluded from the patent
system. See, for example, 42 USC § 2181(a) (excluding nuclear weapons from patentable
subject matter); AIA § 33(a), 125 Stat at 340 (excluding claims directed to human organ-
isms from patentability).
169 See note 91 and accompanying text.
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As discussed in Part III.C, some applications of the novelty
requirement are clearly intended to influence a mutually exclu-
sive choice. When an inventor has actual knowledge that her
claimed invention was previously invented by someone else,
patent law seeks to deter her from claiming the work of another.
Beyond that, when a prospective inventor could have known
that a problem had already been solved, the novelty rules are
designed to make it more attractive to search for and find the
existing solution rather than wastefully reinvent it. In either
case, denying patent protection shapes future inventors' incen-
tives in ways patent law cares about.170
But the novelty requirement sweeps more broadly than
that, working to deny patents to inventions that could have been
found only in "obscure" prior art-references or activities un-
known to the inventor and that a reasonably diligent search
would not have uncovered. In cases like these, the novelty
requirement appears rooted in costs alone, with no apparent
goal of influencing prospective inventors' decisions.
Obscure prior art can arise in two ways. First, some activi-
ties and documents can count as prior art even though they
would have been extremely expensive to uncover at the time of
the invention. For example, the Federal Circuit has held that a
single copy of a doctoral thesis sitting in a foreign library can
anticipate an invention, so long as the library maintains a
subject matter index.171 In another case, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that a Usenet post that was not text searchable at the
time was nonetheless prior art because Usenet groups them-
selves were hierarchically organized by topic-in the rough
sense that someone interested in learning how to write web code
could avoid reading Usenet posts about Wiccan practice or
stories of surviving motorcycle accidents.172
170 See Part III.C.
171 See In re Hall, 781 F2d 897, 899-900 (Fed Cir 1986).
172 See Suffolk Technologies, LLC v AOL Inc, 752 F3d 1358, 1365 (Fed Cir 2014).
Another famous example involved a drawing that was originally filed as part of a Canadian
patent application but canceled during prosecution and thus omitted from the issued
patent-and that could only be discovered by traveling, in person, to the Canadian
Patent Office in Hull, Quebec. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the existence of the
published patent would have provided a "roadmap" to make exactly such a trip to see
whether any material had been canceled during prosecution. See Bruckelmyer v Ground
Heaters, Inc, 445 F3d 1374, 1378-79 (Fed Cir 2006).
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It seems unlikely that even a reasonably diligent search
would have led the prospective inventor to references like these.
Of course, reasonable minds might disagree about what, exactly,
a reasonably diligent search will entail. But they cannot dispute
that the standard implies some outer boundary-"reasonable dil-
igence" is not "infinite diligence." As proponents of the incentives-
to-search theory have explained, when prior disclosure of the so-
lution was so obscure that the expected costs of finding it exceed
the cost of creating it independently, there is no reason to penal-
ize the inventor for coming up with the same thing on her own.173
From this perspective, outcomes like the ones described in the
prior paragraph are tough to justify: it is simply implausible that
actual flesh-and-blood inventors are expected to embark on a
world tour of foreign libraries and read every Usenet post ever
written in the field before doing any inventing of their own. 174
The second category of obscure prior art does not require
any speculation about the metes and bounds of reasonable dili-
gence. Some activities and documents can count as prior art
even though they would have been actually impossible for the
inventor to find before inventing. Pending patent applications
are a classic example. Until they are published or granted by the
PTO, patent applications are considered confidential and not
available to the public.175 But after publication or issuance, an
application becomes prior art effective as of the day it was filed,
meaning it can defeat the novelty of an invention made while
the application was pending.176 As a result, even an inventor
who diligently searches the prior art before inventing cannot
173 See Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 402 (cited in note 104).
174 Some of these cases suggest that the Federal Circuit has not fully embraced the
incentives-to-search theory. Despite repeated references to a standard of "persons inter-
ested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence,"
see Kyocera Wireless Corp v International Trade Commission, 545 F3d 1340, 1350 (Fed
Cir 2008) (citations omitted), the Federal Circuit has not stepped through the kind of
cost-benefit analysis usually expected of the "reasonable person" in other contexts. These
cases turn on objective indicia of accessibility, not a comparison of the expected costs of
search versus reinvention. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The
Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 Minn L Rev 679, 711 (2003)
(noting that the test seems to be one of "constructive accessibility") (quotation marks
omitted). Nonetheless, the outcomes of these cases can perhaps be defended on the basis
of ex post costs. See notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
175 See 35 USC § 122.
176 See 35 USC § 102(a)(2); Baxter International, Inc v COBE Laboratories, Inc, 88
F3d 1054, 1062 (Fed Cir 1996) (Newman dissenting) (explaining a similar pre-AIA provi-
sion codified at 35 USC § 102(e)).
1274 [84:1217
The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System
rule out the possibility that a secret pending application will
later emerge and preclude patentability.177
Withholding patents in cases like these-when extreme cost
or actual impossibility would prevent even a reasonably diligent
search from uncovering the anticipating prior art-does nothing
to increase incentives to perform a reasonably diligent search in
the future. Whether or not the inventor performs a reasonably
diligent search will make no difference in her result: if she is
unlucky enough to invent something that happens to be antici-
pated by obscure prior art, her patent is invalid.178 Denials like
these do not guide incentives at the juncture of a mutually ex-
clusive choice, because the outcomes of the cases do not predict-
ably turn on the inventor's decision at all.179
The rationale for denying patents in light of obscure prior
art appears to be rooted exclusively in concerns about ex post
costs. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[T]he stringent re-
quirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the
public domain remain there for the free use of the public."180
Removing something from the public domain risks imposing
significant ex post costs-not only on the parties who may have
adopted that specific technology, but also on the public more
broadly, by undermining the reliability of the public domain go-
ing forward.181 The Supreme Court considers this concern so
trenchant that it has, in dicta at least, elevated novelty to the
level of a constitutional requirement, declaring that "Congress
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
177 The chance for unsearchable prior art to defeat patentability was further
expanded by the recent move to a first-to-file system. See AIA § 3, 125 Stat at 285.
Because the patent goes to the first person to get a proper application on file, a prospec-
tive inventor is now vulnerable not only to applications that might already be pending,
but also to any future applications that might be filed before the prospective inventor is
able to file her own application. Obviously, no amount of searching can reveal the exist-
ence of competing inventions that have not yet been made.
178 See Bruckelmyer, 445 F3d at 1378.
179 See Kaplow, 23 J Legal Stud at 313-14, 332 (cited in note 150) (observing that
greater accuracy in adjudication can be a waste of resources if actors lack the same
information at the moment of their decision-making). In some range, the risk of obscure
prior art might cause prospective inventors to overinvest in search, but, as the cost of
discovering existing solutions approaches the cost of reinvention, such inventors will be
better off simply doing the development work and taking the risk of obscure prior art.
For criticism of the novelty requirement in cases of obscure prior art, see Alan Devlin,
Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 Sw U L Rev 323, 344-45 (2008).
180 Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co, 440 US 257, 262 (1979).
181 See Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 141-43 (Harvard 2011).
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remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available."182
This concern about ex post costs is not limited to cases of
obscure prior art. Indeed, the novelty requirement serves an im-
portant role in limiting the costs of the patent in cases of obscure
and nonobscure prior art alike.183 The difference is that, in the
case of the latter, the novelty requirement also plays a role in
shaping inventors' incentives to conduct a reasonably diligent
search before inventing. As a result, errors in the application of
the novelty requirement in cases involving obscure prior art
should be balanced under the one-sided incentives model, while
the more demanding, two-sided incentives model is the appro-
priate framework for cases involving prior art the inventor knew
or should have known about.184
As the prior discussion shows, there is no simple answer to
the question do the patentability requirements seek to influence a
mutually exclusive choice? For the disclosure requirements, the
answer appears to be a categorical "yes"-disclosure is a choice
patent law cares about, and the decision is intended to be a mu-
tually exclusive one for applicants. By contrast, the patentable
subject matter exclusions appear not to be targeted at a mutual-
ly exclusive choice. Patent protection is withheld for inventions
182 Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City, 383 US 1, 6 (1966). Note, however, that
on a number of occasions Congress has granted patent protection after inventions en-
tered the public domain, though its power to do this is questionable after Graham. See
Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 233-35 (2003) (Stevens dissenting) (describing private
bills to extend patent terms passed between 1790 and 1875).
183 See Kimberly-Clark Corp v Johnson & Johnson, 745 F2d 1437, 1453 (Fed Cir
1984) ("[T]he real reason for the denial of patent rights [in cases lacking novelty] is the
basic principle . . . that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the public
domain technology already available to the public."). See also Craig Allen Nard, Legal
Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent Law, 69 Vand L Rev 1517, 1528-29 (2016)
(explaining the legal fiction of presumptive knowledge in terms of protecting the public
domain and administrability).
184 To the extent obviousness ever implicates a mutually exclusive choice, see
Part IIIA, it is almost certainly vulnerable to this case-specific complication as well. In
some cases, the prior art rendering a solution obvious did not yet exist at the time of
invention or would have been extremely expensive for the inventor to uncover. Outcomes
like these are difficult to justify on the basis of ex ante incentives, suggesting that at
least in some cases the obviousness requirement appears principally concerned with mit-
igating ex post costs.
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in these categories out of concerns of cost, not because these pro-
jects are any less valuable.
Other doctrines are harder to categorize. For the novelty re-
quirement, the answer seems to depend on the nature of the
prior art at issue. When novelty is precluded by prior art the in-
ventor knew about or could have reasonably found, the doctrine
seeks to influence a number of mutually exclusive decisions
involving fraudulent patenting, reinvention, and search. But
when obscure prior art is at issue, the intent to influence a mu-
tually exclusive choice is absent, suggesting these denials are
rooted only in costs. And, when it comes to perhaps the most
important choice patent law seeks to influence-the decision to
invent-the presence or absence of a mutually exclusive choice
is simply unclear.
This analysis is not intended to be conclusive-reasonable
minds could disagree about the purposes of these doctrines or
suggest other mutually exclusive choices that have been over-
looked here. But this discussion does illustrate the complexity of
the mutually exclusive choice condition. Evaluating that condi-
tion requires discerning the purpose of individual patent rules at
a granular level and identifying situations in which that pur-
pose may or may not be frustrated as a result of spurious
rewards. As the novelty rules illustrate, a doctrine can be rooted
in concerns about ex post costs in some cases and rooted in con-
cerns about ex ante incentives in other cases. As the obviousness
requirement illustrates, for some doctrines our existing under-
standings of the patent system and the nature of invention may
be inadequate to answer the question.
This distinction might seem a fine one, but it bears great
consequence when it comes to the cost of erring in cases of
uncertainty. When a doctrine is rooted in concerns about ex post
costs, an undeserved patent imposes those ex post costs unnec-
essarily. But when a doctrine is rooted in concerns about ex ante
incentives, an undeserved patent imposes ex post costs and re-
duces ex ante incentives. This is the "double harm" of false posi-
tives under the two-sided incentives model. The difference has
far-reaching consequences, both for the optimal balance of errors
at a systemic level, and for the value of rooting out erroneous
patent grants after the fact.
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Erring against Patentability
As discussed in Part I, the patent system presently errs in
favor of patent rights at nearly every turn. By now, the sources
of this bias are well known. Patent applications are reviewed
with a presumption of patentability; patent examiners are short
on time and lack access to certain categories of prior art; the
PTO itself has an institutional interest in favoring allowance;
granted patents enjoy a presumption of validity; many such
patents are never challenged or litigated to judgment.185 These
procedural rules and structural features cause the patent
system to err in favor of affording protection in objectively close
cases.
A number of scholars have proposed reforms to rebalance
the errors of the patent system to be less friendly toward patent
rights in cases of uncertainty. For example, Professor Sean
Seymore has suggested that, at the application stage, those
seeking patents should be charged with the burden of persua-
sion when it comes to their entitlement to the rights they seek.186
Under Seymore's proposal, the PTO would still be charged with
the burden of production-that is, bringing forth evidence as to
why a claim is unpatentable. Once such evidence is presented,
the applicant would then be required to carry the burden of
persuasion.187 The goal of this reform would be to subject appli-
cations to additional scrutiny and reduce the number of "low-
quality" (that is, false positive) patents issued by the PTO.188
Others have suggested changes to make it easier to correct
false positives at the enforcement stage. A particularly common
target is the presumption of validity, which requires a challenger
to show a patent's invalidity by "clear and convincing" evidence.
For example, Professors Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley have
185 See Part I.B.
186 See Seymore, 97 Minn L Rev at 1023-31 (cited in note 43). See also Lemley, 95
Nw U L Rev at 1524 (cited in note 6).
187 Seymore, 97 Minn L Rev at 1023-31 (cited in note 43).
188 Id at 1040-41. Along slightly different lines, Professor Merges has suggested that
examiners should be given greater credit for rejecting applications, to correct the pro-
issuance bias that exists at the level of individual examiners. See Merges, 14 Berkeley
Tech L J at 607-09 (cited in note 1). And Professor Jonathan Masur has suggested that
third-party appeal mechanisms could correct the pro-issuance bias that exists at the lev-
el of the agency itself. See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 522 (cited in note 1).
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suggested that standard be lowered, except in cases in which an
applicant previously opted into a more rigorous, "gold-plated"
review process in the PTO.189 Judge William Alsup has proposed a
statutory reform in which the strength of the presumption would
vary depending on whether the examiner had the opportunity to
consider the argument for invalidity in the first instance.190 All of
these proposals are rooted in the claim that the existing presump-
tion provides too much shelter to weak patents-that is, that the
system errs too heavily in favor of tolerating false positives to
avoid false negatives.191
The two-sided incentives model developed above has the
potential to lend prescriptive weight and increased specificity to
these reforms. At a minimum, recognizing an additional, previ-
ously unappreciated harm from erroneous patent grants sug-
gests that the probability of patentability necessary to justify a
patent should be higher, all else equal.192 But, more specifically,
under certain conditions the incentive effects of false positives
can narrow the range of plausible probability thresholds, sug-
gesting that the minimum probability of patentability to justify
patent rights starts at 50 percent and goes up from there.193 In
this way, the incentive harm caused by false positives can pro-
vide a theoretical path to showing that the current bias in favor
of patent rights is inappropriate, and without relying on any
assumptions about the costs and benefits of patent protection in
general.
There are, however, several questions that will require fu-
ture investigation to make these conclusions robust. First, as
noted above, the 50 percent minimum probability threshold de-
pends on the assumption that the incentive harm from a false
positive is at least as great as the incentive harm from a false
negative. There are reasons to think that will often be the
case, 194 but, ultimately, the question is an empirical one. If, for
example, managers of technology firms are acutely aware of
189 See Lichtman and Lemley, 60 Stan L Rev at 59-62 (cited in note 1). See also
Devlin, 37 Sw U L Rev at 352-58 (cited in note 179) (making a similar proposal).
190 Alsup, 24 Berkeley Tech L J at 1649 (cited in note 33).
191 See, for example, Lichtman and Lemley, 60 Stan L Rev at 47 (cited in note 1);
Alsup, 24 Berkeley Tech L J at 1650 (cited in note 33); Masur, 121 Yale L J at 473 (cited
in note 1); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 589 (cited in note 1).
192 See note 92 and accompanying text.
193 See note 96 and accompanying text.
194 See notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
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improper denials but oblivious to the phenomenon of undeserved
grants, that would seriously undermine the claim that false
positives affect incentives in this way. Future work will be nec-
essary to better understand how errors affect prospective inven-
tors' perceptions of the marginal rewards offered by the patent
system.
A second matter requiring further study is the mutual
exclusivity condition. While there are some patentability deter-
minations that appear to be squarely directed at mutually
exclusive decisions (such as those involving the disclosure re-
quirements) and some that just as clearly appear not to be (such
as those involving the patentable subject matter exclusions),
there are others for which the answer is more complicated. As
shown in the analysis above, assessing this condition often
forces difficult questions about the purposes of the doctrines
themselves and the constraints faced by prospective inventors.
As the significance of this condition was not previously appreci-
ated, it seems likely that additional analysis (and debate) will be
necessary before there is a firm consensus as to which patent doc-
trines are intended to influence decisions at all and under what
conditions those decisions are likely to be mutually exclusive.
Third, there is an additional complication not yet men-
tioned. It is possible that in some cases requiring multiple
patentability determinations, false negatives could be conjunc-
tive, in the sense that an inventor's incentives to do one thing
might be affected by a risk that the inventor will be accused of
failing to do other things. For example, it is clear than an inven-
tor's incentives to comply with the disclosure requirements will
depend on the probability that she will get a patent even if she
does not make a complete disclosure (a single potential false pos-
itive). But in the other direction, her incentives will also depend
on the probability that, even if she does make a complete disclo-
sure, she will nonetheless be denied a patent for failing to satisfy
the disclosure requirements (one potential false negative) or for
failing to satisfy the novelty requirements (another potential
false negative) or for failing to satisfy the nonobviousness
requirements (still another potential false negative), and so on.
An error in the application of the patentable subject matter
requirements (which, again, are not intended to influence a mu-
tually exclusive choice) could inadvertently affect marginal
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rewards to fulfill the disclosure requirements (which, again, are
intended to influence a mutually exclusive choice).
This complication could be avoided if there were a single,
agreed goal of the patent system, or if it were understood that
one goal so dominated the others that marginal rewards need be
attended along only a single frontier. But so long as the patent
system seeks to influence multiple decisions simultaneously, one
must confront the fact that balancing the errors in the enforce-
ment of any one rule will affect marginal rewards to comply with
other rules. In the end, balancing the errors in the patent sys-
tem may require a policymaker to confront difficult questions
about the comparative importance of the various goals of that
system.195
B. The Public Benefits of Patent Challenges
Aside from the question of how the patent system should err
in cases of uncertainty, these observations also have implica-
tions for when and how much scrutiny should be applied to
claims of patent rights. This Section briefly explores how the
incentives-reducing harm of false positives can affect the value
of testing a patent's validity after it has been granted.
Although the discussion above is framed around an abstract
"patent system," in practice, decisions about patentability are
made at a series of steps across a patent's life. The PTO first ex-
amines an application to determine if a patent should be grant-
ed at all. This initial examination step is hurried, ex parte, and
comparatively cursory.1 96 If a patent is granted, it may then be
subjected to adversarial proceedings of a significantly more
searching character, including litigation in federal district court
and administrative challenges before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board.197 These postgrant challenge mechanisms have
the benefits of better information and longer deliberation, but
195 See Yelderman, 96 BU L Rev at 1598-1614 (cited in note 13). Note, however,
that for some patent doctrines, the potential for conflict may be smaller than it first ap-
pears. For example, if the disclosure requirements play a role both in creating incentives
to disclose and in creating incentives to invent, see note 109, then strictly enforcing the
disclosure requirements may advance both goals simultaneously.
196 See Frakes and Wasserman, 99 Rev Econ & Stat at *8-9 (cited in note 44);
Dreyfuss, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 434 (cited in note 5); Seymore, 49 UC Davis L Rev
at 995-96 (cited in note 33).
197 See 35 USC §§ 282, 311-19, 321-29.
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they are expensive (litigating a case through trial typically costs
$1 million or more)198 and are in various ways restrained from
correcting certain categories of mistakes that might have been
made by the PTO.199
Despite the costs and limitations of patent challenges,
courts and commentators have long endorsed policies to encour-
age more of them. For example, to gin up more patent litigation,
courts have voided otherwise-enforceable contract terms, 200 over-
turned long-standing equitable doctrines,201 and suggested that
the act of settling a patent case can itself trigger antitrust liabil-
ity.202 For their part, commentators have proposed a number of
mechanisms to increase the rate at which issued patents are
challenged in postgrant proceedings-things like bounties, ex-
panded standing rules, and one-way fee shifting.203
This Article's revised account of error costs in the patent
system can potentially provide new support for these pro-
challenge policies.2"0 In addition to the traditionally cited benefit
198 See 2015 Report of the Economic Survey 1-110 to -112 (American Intellectual
Property Law Association 2015). The administrative challenge proceedings are signifi-
cantly less expensive-the average reported attorneys' fees through the hearing stage
are around $330,000. Id at 1-139.
199 District-court litigation cannot reverse grants that are objectively close to the
line of patentability because of the presumption of validity, which requires "clear and
convincing evidence" of a patent's invalidity. See Microsoft Corp v i4i Limited Partnership,
564 US 91, 95 (2011). That heightened presumption does not apply in the PTO's inter
partes review process, but those proceedings are limited to considering arguments for
anticipation and obviousness in light of printed prior art. See 35 USC § 311(b); Cuozzo
Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, 136 S Ct 2131, 2144 (2016); Dolin, 56 BC L Rev at 919-
20 (cited in note 50). A third challenge mechanism, postgrant review, permits the
challenger to make any invalidity arguments based on any kind of prior art, but these
challenges are only available very early in a patent's life. See 35 USC § 321(b)-(c); Dolin,
56 BC L Rev at 914-19 (cited in note 50).
200 See Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 674-75 (1969); Warner-Jenkinson Co v Allied
Chemical Corp, 567 F2d 184, 188 (2d Cir 1977); Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc v Moraine
Products, 509 F2d 1, 6 (6th Cir 1974); Panther Pumps & Equipment Co v Hydrocraft, Inc,
468 F2d 225, 230-32 (7th Cir 1972); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co v Golden State
Advertising Co, 444 F2d 425, 427 (9th Cir 1971).
201 See Lear, 395 US at 674-75.
202 See Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc, 133 S Ct 2223, 2234-37 (2013).
203 See, for example, Thomas, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 340-42 (cited in note 1); Farrell
and Merges, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 968-69 (cited in note 1); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J
Econ Persp at 88-89 (cited in note 5); Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty In-
flation, 85 Ind L J 1003, 1022 (2010); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 672-73
(cited in note 20); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L
Rev 71, 123-27 (2013); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 542-48 (cited in note 1).
204 Traditionally, the most common explanation for why patent cases justify a de-
parture from general pro-settlement principles has been that patent litigation has the
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of saving ex post costs, patent challenges could yield public bene-
fits by increasing the accuracy of the patent system. Specifically,
revoking an undeserved patent through a postgrant process can
reduce future prospective inventors' expectations that they will
someday receive a patent undeservedly. This reduction in the
perceived false-positive rate can in turn increase marginal
rewards for inventing and disclosing in the future. The resulting
public benefits can exist independently of any benefit obtained
by reducing ex post costs-an important feature, given that ex
post costs savings are not necessarily available in every patent
challenge.205
But specifying this potential benefit also reveals its limits.
Just as not every case is a viable candidate to reduce ex post
costs, not every erroneous patent grant will have a deleterious
effect on ex ante incentives. The reason a grant was erroneous
matters significantly. In cases involving a patent doctrine in-
tended to influence a mutually exclusive choice (such as the dis-
closure requirement), the possibility of obtaining patent protec-
tion undeservedly reduces the marginal reward available for
doing the things that doctrine seeks to encourage. Revoking
patents that were erroneously granted on those grounds might
well increase inventors' incentives to comply in the future.206 But
in cases without a mutually exclusive choice at stake, this false-
positive effect is missing. Challenges rooted in cost-only doc-
trines (such as patentable subject matter or anticipation by
obscure prior art) can benefit the public only if they indeed save
ex post costs.
In sum, the public interest in an accurate patent system
might be able to justify policies to encourage certain patent chal-
lenges, but it can only go so far. Contrary to long-standing as-
sumption, the benefits of patent challenges are neither univer-
sally available nor homogenous. A discrete set of challenges may
have the potential to save ex post costs, while another group
may hold the potential to improve ex ante incentives. And some
ability to increase competition, such that it can free the public from the demands of a
"patent monopolist." See Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competi-
tion?, 83 U Chi L Rev 1943, 1951-52 (2016). A few commentators have alluded to the
benefits of increased accuracy in general terms. See note 13.
205 See Yelderman, 83 U Chi L Rev at 1994-95 (cited in note 204).
206 Note that even in cases in which the public benefits of increased accuracy appear
to be available, their magnitude may be quite vexing to estimate. See id at 1956-57.
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challenges may be incapable of providing either benefit at all.
Future work will be necessary to better understand how these
two potential categories of benefits interact, and whether (and
when) these benefits exceed the costs of the legal process neces-
sary to bring them about.
CONCLUSION
It is very much the conventional wisdom that the patent
system makes too many mistakes in a pro-patent direction, and
that the public has an interest in seeing those mistakes corrected
through postgrant litigation. To a great extent, this Article spec-
ifies and confirms a set of intuitions that have long been held by
courts and commentators. There is a public interest in the allo-
cation of the patent system's benefits, and the value of accuracy
here is even greater than has been previously appreciated.
However, this Article has also unearthed a number of previ-
ously unobserved complications. First and foremost, the im-
portance of accuracy depends significantly on the nature of the
potential error in question. An erroneous grant harms ex ante
incentives only if it involves a patentability doctrine designed to
influence a mutually exclusive decision. Future work will be
necessary to fully explore whether (and when) the patentability
requirements are intended to influence future conduct at all, as
well as whether (and when) that conduct is likely to involve
mutually exclusive choices.
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